FRANCE Law and Practice Contributed by: Thierry Marembert, Cécile Labarbe, Aaron Bass and Céline Serpagli, Kiejman & Marembert
for preventing and detecting corruption. The AFA emphasises risk mapping (identifying, assessing and prioritising risks; formalising scenarios by process; and defining action plans) as the “cornerstone” on which an effective compliance programme ought to rely. The AFA has also released non-binding recommenda - tions for private companies as well as public organisa - tions. These recommendations deal with an array of issues, including governance and auditability, or the proper implementation of the eight measures men - tioned above. These recommendations play a signifi - cant role during AFA’s audits. Beyond the fundamental recommendations, the AFA publishes practical guides that translate expectations into concrete controls and processes. In parallel, the PNF has its own sets of non-binding guidelines and recommendations, in particular with respect to DPAs’ negotiations and resolution. 8.3 Compliance Monitorships Prosecutors may require compliance monitoring as part of a corporate resolution, and courts may impose it when sentencing. Under Article 41-1-2, I, 2° of the Code of Criminal Pro - cedure, a CJIP may require the company to “submit to a compliance programme for a maximum period of three years under the supervision of the AFA”. The AFA provides supervision and may call on external experts, with the company bearing these costs up to a ceiling set in the CJIP. The AFA publishes a periodic monitoring report and a final report to the public pros - ecutor at the end of the mandate. Failure to comply with the CJIP may result in its termination by the pub - lic prosecutor (with the resumption of proceedings) and the monitoring costs will not be reimbursed. In addition, Article 131-39-2 of the Criminal Code allows the court to impose a “compliance programme” for a maximum period of five years, again under the supervision of the AFA. In this case the AFA’s role is to assess the existence, quality and effectiveness of the programme (risk map -
ping, third-party due diligence, accounting controls, training, discipline, internal control), to carry out on- site work and to make recommendations; it also co- ordinates with the public prosecutor throughout the measure. Failure by the company’s bodies or representatives to comply with this programme constitutes a separate criminal offence (punishable by a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR50,000). In France, the first example is the CJIP concluded by Société Générale in 2018, in which the bank under - took to have the AFA assess the quality and effective - ness of its measures for two years. More recently, in 2020, Airbus signed a CJIP in which it undertook to have the AFA assess the effectiveness of its compliance programme for three years. 9. Assessment 9.1 Assessment of the Applicable Enforced Legislation France’s anti-corruption legislation is periodically assessed, both internationally and domestically, by government agencies. In 2024, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released its follow-up report on its 2021 Phase 4 review. The report assessed that out of the 44 recommendations made in 2021, 13 had been fully implemented by France, 19 had been partially implemented, and 12 remained to be implemented. As regards the improve - ments highlighted in the report, the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted that France had been proac - tive in investigating and sanctioning foreign bribery cases while the average fine imposed had greatly increased, in great part thanks to the increasing use of DPAs. As a source of concern, the report listed the statutory independence of prosecutors, which it called to be further strengthened. The report also noted that sanctions for natural persons remain weak, with low fines and prison terms which are often suspended in part or in full. The report stressed that confiscation of ill-gotten assets appear to remain rare.
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