HONG KONG Law and Practice Contributed by: Gareth Hughes, Emily Lam, Philip Rohlik and Tiffany Wu, Debevoise & Plimpton
regulated by the HKMA and the SFC are also subject to self-reporting requirements under the Supervisory Policy Manual and the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission (the “SFC Code of Conduct”), respectively. 1.3 Guidelines for the Interpretation and Enforcement of National Legislation One of the ICAC’s missions is public education about corruption. In addition to advertisements, films and other public education materials, the ICAC has pub - lished, through the Corruption Prevention Advisory Service, a specialised unit in its Corruption Prevention Department, various sector-specific guides and tools for corruption prevention, including: • Integrity and Corruption Prevention Guide on Man - aging Relationship with Public Servants; • Sample Code of Conduct (for Members/Employ - ees) of Public Bodies; • Good Governance and Internal Control in Public Organizations; • Sample Code of Conduct for Board Members & Staff of NGOs in Social Welfare Sector; • Sample Code of Conduct for the Private Sector; • Corruption Prevention Guide for Banks; • Corruption Prevention Guide for Insurance Compa - nies; and • Corruption Prevention Guide for Construction Industry. 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation In June 2025, the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Amendment of Schedules 1 and 2) Order 2025 came into effect (the “Amendment Order”). The Amendment Order expands the scope of public bodies to include four new institutions and subject their employees/ officers to the restrictions under the POBO. Under the Amendment Order, four new institutions have been brought within the ambit of the POBO. They are the Hong Kong Investment Corporation Lim - ited, Hong Kong FMI Services Limited, OTC Clearing Hong Kong Limited and CMU OmniClear Limited. In particular, Schedule 2 has been updated so that both OTC Clearing Hong Kong Limited and CMU Omni -
Clear Limited are categorised as bodies of which their office holders and members qualify as public servants under the POBO. Under the Amendment Order, not only will these institutions be subject to restrictions under the POBO, external parties that engage with these institutions will also fall within the scope of the legislative framework of the POBO. 2. Bribery and Corruption Elements 2.1 Bribery The term “bribe” is not defined in the POBO, nor does it form part of the operative wording of any of the offences under the POBO. Instead, the POBO gener - ally prohibits the offering, soliciting or acceptance of any “advantage” for the purpose of inducing someone to, or rewarding someone for, doing or not doing an act or showing favour or disfavour. A person offering an advantage commits an offence even if the recipient did not have the ability to deliver the benefit for which the advantage was given, as long as they, in offering the advantage, believed or sus - pected that the recipient had the ability to deliver the benefit. Similarly, a person accepting an advantage commits an offence even if they did not have the abil - ity to deliver the benefit for which the advantage was given, as long as they, in accepting the advantage, believed or suspected that the advantage was given for the purpose of securing a benefit. Bribery of Public Officials “Public servants”, as defined in the POBO, include prescribed officers, employees of public bodies and non-honorary office holders, as well as other individ - uals involved in the conduct or management of the affairs of certain public bodies. Prescribed officers are a class of public servants sub - ject to more stringent requirements. Section 3 of the POBO imposes a general prohibition on all prescribed officers, making it an offence for them to solicit or accept any advantage without permission from the chief executive. Contravention of this section does not require any corrupt motive. Prescribed officers include:
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