UK Law and Practice Contributed by: Neil Swift, Jasvinder Nakhwal, Charlotte Tregunna and Rachel Cook, Peters & Peters
imprisonment after admitting eight charges of brib - ery relating to the taking of bribes for pro-Russia interviews and speeches. This was the highest sentence yet imposed against an individual con - victed under the Act. Corporate entities convicted under Section 1, 2, 6 or 7 of the BA 2010, or under the ECCTA 2023 “failure to prevent fraud” offence, are subject to unlimited fines. The starting point is generally the gross profit or financial benefit obtained or sought from the offend - ing, adjusted for culpability and aggravating/mitigat - ing features. Recent examples illustrate the scale of corporate sanctions: • Airbus (2020 DPA): GBP991 million UK share of a EUR3.6 billion global settlement. • Glencore (2022 conviction): GBP280 million fine. • Entain (2023 DPA): GBP585 million financial pen - alty, GBP20 million charitable donation, GBP10 million costs. DPAs continue to be accompanied by stringent com - pliance undertakings, independent monitoring and extensive remedial obligations. Companies are not under duties to set up compliance programmes to prevent corruption, unless there is a regulatory obligation to do so. For example, those in the financial sector should have appropriate financial crime controls in place. Failure to put into place adequate procedures to pre - vent bribery will result, however, in the company not having a defence if it is subsequently charged under Section 7 of the BA 2010 (as discussed in 2.1 Bribery ). If found liable under Section 7, companies may face unlimited fines, and individuals involved can, if pros - ecuted for bribery under the Act, be imprisoned for up to ten years (individuals cannot be prosecuted for the 8. Compliance Expectations 8.1 Compliance Obligations
Section 7 offence). More broadly, organisations risk reputational damage and civil recovery orders. 8.2 Compliance Guidelines and Best Practices As mentioned in 1.3 Guidelines for the Interpretation and Enforcement of National Legislation , the Ministry of Justice is under a statutory duty to provide guid - ance concerning the “failure to prevent” offences. This guidance outlines government expectations for what constitutes “adequate procedures”. These include proportionate procedures, top-level commit - ment, risk assessment, due diligence, communica - tion, monitoring and review. The SFO and CPS also provide materials to supple - ment this guidance. The SFO’s Guidance on Corporate Cooperation and Enforcement in relation to Corporate Criminal Offending assists prosecutors to evaluate the adequacy of compliance programmes when deciding whether to bring charges or negotiate a settlement. 8.3 Compliance Monitorships UK enforcement bodies have the option of requiring a compliance monitor as part of corporate resolutions (particularly within the DPA framework). Under DPAs, a company agrees to fulfil specific condi - tions, such as paying a financial penalty, co-operat - ing with investigations and implementing compliance improvements, in exchange for the suspension (and eventual dismissal) of criminal proceedings. One of the possible conditions that enforcement authorities may include in a DPA is the appointment of an inde - pendent compliance monitor. The appointment of a compliance monitor typically occurs where the SFO or CPS determines a compa - ny’s existing compliance programme is inadequate or that there is a significant risk of reoffending. The moni - tor’s duties may include reviewing policies and pro - cedures, testing internal controls, evaluating training and reporting systems and making recommendations for improvement.
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