USA – GEORGIA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Lohr Beck and Kasey Clark, King & Spalding LLP
Georgia Statutory Law Update: Proposed Legislation Targeting Algorithmic Pricing Tools in Rental Real Estate As noted in the Georgia Trends & Developments article for the Antitrust Litigation 2025 Practice Guide, Georgia lacks a comprehensive antitrust enforcement frame - work modelled after the Sherman or Clayton Acts, and most antitrust disputes with a Georgia connection are litigated in the state’s federal courts under federal stat - utes. In the past year, there have been no changes to Georgia’s antitrust statutory framework, which contin - ues to rest on three sources of substantive law: • the state constitution’s prohibition on agreements that have the effect of “lessening competition” or “encouraging a monopoly” Ga. Const. art. III, § VI, para. V(c); • O.C.G.A. Section 13-8-2’s declaration that con - tracts in general restraint of trade are unenforce - able as contrary to public policy; and • common law, which supplies a tort cause of action to parties injured by conspiracies in restraint of trade. Targeted statutory intervention may be on the horizon, however. In each of the last two legislative sessions, a bill has been introduced in the Georgia General Assembly targeting the use of algorithmic pricing tools in connection with residential housing – legislation which is plainly responsive to the ongoing RealPage and Yardi litigation and related government actions described in our 2025 update. Although neither bill was ultimately enacted because neither received a floor vote, the bills could foreshadow future additions to Georgia’s statutory framework. HB 679 (2025 session) House Bill 679, the “End Rental Price-Fixing Act,” would have amended Chapter 8 of Title 13 of the O.C.G.A. – the chapter governing illegal and void contracts – by adding a new Section 13-8-5 prohibiting agreements involving rental price-fixing with respect to residential rental properties. The bill’s findings identified, among other things, a “recent increase i[n] coordination among landlords to fix rental prices” and noted that the Depart - ment of Justice (DOJ) had recently sued a Georgia landlord for price-fixing, likely referring to the action that the DOJ and ten state attorneys general brought against Atlanta-based property manager Cortland
Management, LLC and seven other property managers or landlords in United States v RealPage , Inc ., No .1:24- cv-00710-LCB-JLW (M.D.N.C. filed Aug. 23, 2024). The bill targeted the use of a “price-fixing function,” defined as including all three of the following: • collecting historical or contemporaneous rental prices, supply levels, or lease termination and renewal dates from two or more competing land - lords; • analysing that information through a computational system, including one using machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques; and • recommending rental prices, renewal terms, or ideal occupancy levels to a landlord. The bill would have barred any person from entering into an agreement involving price-fixing, deemed such an agreement an unenforceable contract in general restraint of trade under Section 13-8-2, and made entry into such an agreement a felony punishable by one to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of USD1,000 to USD5,000, or both. A separate provision would have barred landlords from setting rental prices based on a price-fixing function, subject to a carve-out for con - duct undertaken pursuant to federal or state afford - able or low-income housing programmes. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Gabriel Sanchez, testified in a committee hearing that the legislation was drafted in response to RealPage. Sanchez described the company’s algorithmic software as being sold to landlords competing in the same market and used to calculate rents from non-public market information – a process that Sanchez characterised as “essentially... price collusion.” Ga. House Judiciary Comm., Judici - ary 04.01.25, YouTube (Apr. 1, 2025), at 00:07:50. He explained that the bill would codify that the practice “cannot be used to set rental prices,” would render such existing contracts unenforceable, and would “effectively ban[] this kind of AI algorithmic software for fixing rental prices in the housing market.” Id. at 00:08:20–00:09:16. The hearing also surfaced objections. A representative of the Georgia Association of REALTORS testified that his concern was “not so much in attacking the problem of price fixing,” but rather “how we’re defining it here,”
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