USA – GEORGIA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Lohr Beck and Kasey Clark, King & Spalding LLP
Second, the court found that the agreements between Tyson on the one hand and Koch and Wayne on the oth - er were vertical, not horizontal. Id. at *17–18. The court reasoned that Tyson negotiated the 2017 offal purchase agreements as a prospective renderer, placing it at a dif - ferent level of the supply chain than Koch and Wayne. Id. at *17. According to the court, simply because Tyson dealt with Koch and Wayne horizontally in some con - texts did not mean that their separate vertical dealings would be subject to a per se analysis. Id. at *18. With respect to the hub-and-spoke conspiracy claim, the court found that the claim failed for lack of a hori - zontal “rim” between Koch and Wayne. Id. at *18–21. Tyson was prepared to proceed with either supplier alone, and the court found there was no evidence of an implicit or explicit agreement between Koch and Wayne to join Tyson. Id. Finally, the court held that, because API could not establish a horizontal group boycott or a hub-and- spoke conspiracy, it likewise could not establish that it had suffered an injury sufficient to establish anti - trust standing. Id. at *23. Had API proven a per se horizontal restraint, antitrust injury would have been presumed, but without one, the court explained that API was required to show affirmatively that it suffered “injury of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.” Id. at *24–25. Of the three injuries API alleged – a devalued sale price for its assets, lost profits, and the harm from Tyson’s “bulldozing” its way into the market – the court found that the first two did not flow from conduct the antitrust laws forbid. Id. at *24. With respect to API’s “bulldozer” theory – drawn from Hanover 3201 Realty , LLC v Village Supermarkets , Inc ., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015) and Blue Shield v McCready , 457 U.S. 465 (1982) – API was required to show that its harm was “a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy”, but the court found that it could not do so because Tyson could have feasibly built its own plants instead of buying API’s plants, such that buying API’s plants was not Tyson’s only (or a “neces - sary”) route into the market. Id. at *24–25.
API appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, where the appeal is currently pending as Am . Proteins , Inc . v River Val- ley Ingredients , LLC, No. 26-11066 (11th Cir.). In its opening brief on appeal, API contends that the dis - trict court erred in several respects. For the Section 2 claims, API argues that the court used the wrong cost measure – incorrectly crediting Tyson’s posi - tive gross margins as proof of profitability when API’s expert found Tyson never earned a positive net mar - gin, which, under McGahee v N . Propane Gas Co ., 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), is circumstantial evidence of predatory intent. Br. of Appellant, Am . Proteins , Inc . v River Valley Ingredients , LLC , No. 26-11066, ECF No. 20 at 26–39 (11th Cir. July 8, 2026). On the Sec - tion 1 claim, API argues the district court improperly • “dismembered” the alleged conspiracy by parsing each offal purchase agreement as an isolated verti - cal deal rather than assessing the broader horizon - tal boycott; • required API to disprove innocent explanations rather than merely raise a genuine dispute; and • weighed credibility – thereby discounting Tyson’s memo describing the agreements’ “intent” as pressuring a sale and Koch’s characterisation of its agreement as “a ploy to get API to sell to Tyson.” Id. at 39–55. Finally, API argues the court disposed of the rule-of- reason claims without substantive analysis and on a circular standing rationale, using its rejection of the horizontal conspiracy theory to deny standing on theories that do not depend on proving a horizontal conspiracy. Id. at 55–63. Briefing is scheduled to be completed in the autumn of 2026. Conclusion The past two legislative sessions of the Georgia Gen - eral Assembly suggest that Georgia may eventually enact targeted antitrust legislation. For now, antitrust litigation in the state remains focused on federal anti - trust statutes, with companion claims sometimes brought under Georgia state law. Recent cases such as Fleet Salvage and pending appeals such as Ameri- can Proteins are positioned to shape the standards that will govern aftermarket protections, exclusive supply arrangements, and antitrust standing in the Eleventh Circuit.
270 A NTITRUST LI T IGATI O N 2026
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