CANADA Law and Practice Contributed by: David Gadsden, Brendan O’Grady and Anton Rizor, Baker McKenzie
timelines vary depending on the forum, the complex - ity of the issues, and whether appeals are brought. Proceedings before the Competition Tribunal are often resolved within approximately 18 to 24 months, although complex merger and abuse of dominance cases may take considerably longer. By contrast, pri - vate competition class actions frequently span five to ten years or more. Certification (and related appeals) can take several years, and cases typically settle before reaching trial. Statutory Basis for Class and Collective Actions Canada has a well-established statutory framework for class proceedings. Each province has enacted class proceedings legislation, while class actions brought in the Federal Court are governed by Part 5.1 of the Federal Courts Rules. While procedural requirements vary by jurisdiction, the statutory frameworks across Canada are broadly similar and provide a structured mechanism for advancing representative claims on behalf of large groups of affected persons. 4. Class and Collective Actions 4.1 Statutory Basis In the antitrust law context, Section 36 of the Compe - tition Act provides a statutory cause of action for any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of conduct contrary to the criminal provisions in Part VI of the Act, including conspiracy (Section 45), for - eign directives (Section 46), bid-rigging (Section 47) and deceptive marketing (Section 52). This provision forms the basis for most competition class actions in Canada. Recent amendments that came into force in June 2025 also introduced a new form of collective redress before the Competition Tribunal. Private parties may, with leave, seek remedies for certain civil reviewable practices, including refusal to deal (Section 75), price maintenance (Section 76), exclusive dealing, tied sell - ing and market restriction (Section 77), abuse of domi - nance (Sections 78-79), anti-competitive agreements (Section 90.1) and deceptive marketing practices (Section 74.1). The Tribunal may order a disgorgement remedy to be distributed among all persons affected
by the conduct, creating a collective recovery mecha - nism that bears similarities to a class action. 4.2 Opting In or Out Opt-Out Regime in Canadian Class Proceedings Canadian class proceedings generally operate on an opt-out basis. Once a class action is certified and the class definition is approved, individuals who fall within that definition are automatically included in the pro - ceeding unless they take steps to withdraw during the court-ordered opt-out period. Class members who do not opt out are bound by any judgment or settlement reached in the action. Following certification, courts direct how notice will be provided to class members, often through elec - tronic publications, law firm websites, social media and newspapers. Some provinces depart from the general opt-out mod - el for certain non-resident class members. In particu - lar, New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador may require non-residents to opt in before participat - ing in a class proceeding. 4.3 Direct/Indirect Purchasers Direct and Indirect Purchaser Claims Under Canadian antitrust law, both direct and indirect purchasers may seek damages under Section 36 of the Competition Act. The Supreme Court of Canada resolved a long-standing debate in its 2013 trilogy of decisions, Pro - Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Cor- poration , Sun - Rype Products Ltd v Archer Daniels Midland Company , and Infineon Technologies AG v Option consommateurs . In those cases, the Court confirmed that Section 36 is not limited to purchas - ers that acquired a product directly from the alleged wrongdoer. Indirect purchasers, namely persons who purchased through one or more intermediaries in the distribution chain, may also claim losses resulting from the alleged anti-competitive conduct. In Pioneer Corp . v Godfrey , the Supreme Court rec - ognised claims by umbrella purchasers, being pur - chasers of products or services that were not sold by the alleged conspirators, but whose prices were allegedly inflated under the “umbrella” created by the anti-competitive conduct.
48 A NTITRUST LI T IGATI O N 2026
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