INTRODUCTION Contributed by: Franz Hoffet, Homburger
Big Tech in Focus The past year has delivered a series of antitrust deci - sions that will impact competition law for years to come. In August 2024, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Google had illegally maintained a monopoly in general search and search text advertising. The remedies phase, which occu - pied much of 2025, proved even more consequential: the Department of Justice (DOJ) sought the divesti - ture of the Chrome browser, mandatory licensing of Google’s search index, and behavioural obligations designed to prevent the recycling of search data as a barrier to entry. The US District Court for the Dis - trict of Columbia, while barring certain exclusive deals with device manufacturers and ordering the sharing of data, refused to order a divestiture of Chrome. In April 2025, Judge Leonie Brinkema delivered a second rul - ing against Google, finding in United States v Google LLC that the company holds an illegal monopoly in the markets for publisher ad servers and open-web display advertising exchanges. Digital Markets: Regulation and Litigation Converge In the European Union, 2025 marked the first use of enforcement powers under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). In March 2025, the European Commission issued its first DMA fines: Apple was penalised with EUR500 million for failing to comply with interoper - ability obligations governing its App Store, and Meta was fined EUR200 million for its “consent or pay” advertising model. These decisions represent a sig - nificant shift in the enforcement model: rather than requiring proof of harm in a specific market, the DMA imposes ex ante obligations whose breach is, in itself, a sanctionable infringement. Parallel Article 102 inves - tigations against the same companies remain active, and the interaction between the two regimes – their respective standards of proof, remedial tools, and appeal routes has become a highly debated question in EU competition law. In the United Kingdom, the Digital Markets, Compe - tition and Consumers Act 2024 equipped the Com - petition and Markets Authority (CMA) with a new “strategic market status” (SMS) designation power. By mid-2025, the CMA had opened formal investiga - tions into both Google, in relation to its dominance in
search and search advertising, and Apple, following a market investigation. Both Google and Apple ended a respective investigation by accepting commitments. AI Infrastructure, Monopolisation and Algorithms Competition authorities have identified the artificial intelligence sector as an enforcement priority – not merely because AI tools may be used for anti-com - petitive purposes, but because the infrastructure underpinning the AI economy is itself becoming highly concentrated. In September 2024, the CMA published its final report on AI foundation models, identifying significant risks arising from the market power of a small number of technology companies over cloud capacity, semiconductor supply chains, and founda - tional model development. Investigations followed in 2025, for example against Meta with respect to its policy regarding the restriction of access to WhatsApp for AI providers. The European Commission has made AI market structure a priority in its 2025–2029 enforce - ment agenda focusing on the active implementation of the EU AI Act. In the United States, the FTC v Meta Platforms trial, which commenced in April 2025, raises the questions whether established platforms (Facebook) can use acquisitions (Instagram, WhatsApp) to entrench domi - nance in adjacent markets. In November 2025, the US District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) lawsuit on the basis that Meta did not monopolise the market due to competition from TikTok and YouTube. The DOJ’s civil antitrust complaint against RealPage, filed in August 2024, addresses another concern: that the use of common pricing algorithms by competing firms can generate co-ordinated outcomes without any direct communication. The DOJ settlement with RealPage outlines the framework for the permitted use of historical price data for the training of pricing algo - rithms. Enforcement actions in Europe apply similar reasoning to algorithmic pricing in several industries, investigating alleged “Collusion by Code”. EU Merger Control: Closing Gaps Two structural questions about the reach of EU merger control have recently become prominent in the enforcement debate. The first concerns below-
5 A NTITRUST LI T IGATI O N 2026
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