Collective Redress and Class Actions_2025

FRANCE Law and Practice Contributed by: Grégoire Bertrou and Delphine Grimond, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP

1. Policy Development of Collective Redress/Class Action Mechanisms 1.1 History and Policy Drivers of the Legislative Regime The current French legal framework governing class actions is set out in Law No 2025-391 of 30 April 2025 (commonly referred to as the “Law of 30 April 2025”), which simultaneously transposes Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions and introduces a comprehensive reform of the domestic regime appli- cable to group litigation. Before this reform, class actions were first introduced into French law by the so-called Hamon Law of 2014 [Law n° 2014-344, 17 March 2014, about consumer Law], named after the Minister who sponsored the bill. The original regime was designed by the legislature as a narrowly tailored mechanism, initially limited to consumer-related claims. Over time, France developed a total of seven sector- specific class action regimes, covering: • consumer protection (from 2014); • health and cosmetics; • environmental protection; • personal data; • labour law; Each of these regimes operated under distinct rules concerning standing, types of recoverable damage, and procedural requirements. This fragmented land- scape led to legal uncertainty and hindered the effec- tive use of collective redress. The Law of 30 April 2025 replaces these disparate frameworks with a single, unified regime applicable to all class actions – except for a limited carve-out in the public health sector – and considerably broadens both the scope of potential claimants and the types of harm eligible for compensation. • competition law (antitrust); and • anti-discrimination (all from 2016). Preparatory work for the 2025 reform began as early as 2019. A first draft bill was presented in the National Assembly on 15 September 2020, followed by a new

government-submitted version on 31 October 2024. Prior to the initial draft, the Legal Affairs Committee of the National Assembly had commissioned a mis- sion d’information – a temporary parliamentary body tasked with conducting research and public hearings to inform future legislation. The report issued by this mission, dated 11 June 2020, observed: “Despite the broadening of its scope, the track record of this new procedure has been disappointing: only 21 class actions have been brought since 2014, including 14 in the field of consumer protection, and no company has yet been held liable.” The report concluded by recom- mending a broader material scope for class actions and the unification of the existing sectoral regimes. For the time being, the Law of 30 April 2025 is not intended to be codified in any of the existing legisla- tive codes, except for the provisions introducing the civil fine, which are to be incorporated into the French Civil Code. In its opinion of 9 February 2023, the Con- seil d’État (the highest French administrative court) noted that: “The provisions on class actions establish special procedural rules that apply to liability without in any way altering the substantive rules governing this area.” It further held that, since these provisions are not regulatory in nature, they could not be inte- grated into the Code of Civil Procedure. 1.2 Basis for the Legislative Regime, Including Analogous International Laws Across the EU, the opt-in model remains the prevail- ing approach to class actions, largely due to civil law traditions that emphasise procedural formalism and individual autonomy. In countries such as France, Ger- many, and Sweden, affected individuals must actively join the group to benefit from the proceedings or claim compensation. This model is generally seen as more protective of individual rights but tends to lead to low- er participation rates and a limited deterrent effect in practice. By contrast, a few Member States – most notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (in competi- tion law cases) – have adopted opt-out mechanisms, under which individuals are automatically included in the group unless they take steps to withdraw. These systems have demonstrated greater procedural effi- ciency and higher participation rates, enhancing the

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