FRANCE Law and Practice Contributed by: Grégoire Bertrou and Delphine Grimond, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
and after the appeal deadline expired. The court decides the form and scope of publicity and sets the opt-in period, which is now extended to between two months and five years. This longer period is justified by the inclusion of more complex types of harm – such as bodily injuries, which may take considerable time to manifest – and ultimately enhances the protection of victims’ rights. In addition, during this phase, the court may order the defendant to advance the costs of procedures that are not included in the claimant’s legal fees. This includes, for example, expenses related to manag- ing compensation claims. The aim is to ensure that associations without significant liquidity can still pur- sue claims without bearing the financial burden of the Once liability has been established, the court defines the conditions under which individuals who join the group may apply for compensation. Two models are available, as explained below. 1) Individual compensation procedure – Victims apply for compensation either: • directly from the defendant; or • via the claimant association, acting under a spe- cific mandate of representation. The defendant is then required to compensate each individual claimant within a timeframe determined by the court. If they fail to do so, the matter is referred back to the court for individual adjudication. second phase alone. Compensation phase 2) Collective liquidation procedure – This model – not available in cases of bodily harm – involves a group- wide compensation settlement negotiated between the defendant and the qualified entity. It proceeds as follows: • the court defines the harm and the parameters for assessing its value; • the parties attempt to reach a global settlement within a court-imposed period (minimum of six months);
• the court reviews and approves the agreement (homologation); and if the terms are deemed unbalanced, the court may reject the agreement and give the parties an additional two months to renegotiate; • if this second attempt fails, the court will determine the compensation itself; and • for execution, the judgment requires opening a dedicated account with the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (a French public institution tasked with managing public funds), into which the com- pensation must be deposited. A party engaging in dilatory or bad-faith conduct that obstructs settlement negotiations may be sanctioned with a civil fine of up to EUR50,000. This penalty applies equally to both claimants and defendants, which is a controversial aspect, as the financial impact is much lower for a large company than for a small association. As a result, this could encourage power- ful defendants to abandon negotiations after conduct- ing a cost-benefit analysis. Ultimately, the collective settlement mechanism is designed to enhance procedural efficiency, avoid redundant litigation, and integrate mass dispute reso- lution principles into civil proceedings. It embodies a hybrid approach that combines civil procedure with mechanisms of collective redress to ensure access to justice. 3.3 Standing Upon the introduction of class actions into France, the legislature intentionally limited the number of entities permitted to bring such claims, in an effort to prevent the perceived abuses associated with oth- er legal systems, particularly the US model of class action litigation. Under the previous regime, stand- ing was generally restricted to associations that had been officially registered for at least five years and whose statutes expressly provided for the defence of the interests at issue. The eligibility criteria varied by sector: for instance, only nationally recognised and government-approved consumer associations could bring class actions in consumer law, whereas in labour law, representative trade unions had standing to initi- ate proceedings.
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