ECUADOR Trends and Developments Contributed by: Jorge Sicouret Lynch, Víctor Hugo Sicouret Zea, Karla Condo and Carlos Correa, Coronel & Pérez
arbitral tribunal and are not subject to review by ordi- nary judges. This was clarified in Decision No 2822-18-EP/23 (September 2023), in which the ECC held that evi- dentiary matters in arbitration are governed, in the first instance, by party agreement – whether directly in the arbitration clause or by reference to institutional rules – and, in the absence of such an agreement, by the rules adopted by the arbitral tribunal, including by reference to generally accepted arbitral practices, such as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence or the Prague Rules. Ordinary judges must, therefore, respect the procedural framework governing the arbi- tration and defer to the determinations made by the arbitral tribunal. At the same time, the ECC emphasised that this framework must operate within the guarantees of due process. In particular, it held that the procedural rules governing the taking of evidence – whether agreed by the parties or adopted by the arbitral tribunal – must ensure equality between the parties and a full opportunity to present and challenge evidence. On this basis, the ECC identified three core components of evidentiary activity in arbitration: • the assessment of admissibility or pertinence; • the ordering and taking of evidence, where Accordingly, while evidentiary decisions fall within the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal, they remain subject to constitutional limits – the scope and opera- tion of which will be addressed as follows. The iura novit arbiter principle A further dimension of the powers of arbitral tribu- nals in Ecuador concerns the determination of the law applicable to the case. Although the Arbitration Act does not expressly regulate this matter, the ECC has recently confirmed the applicability of the “iura novit arbiter” principle. In Decision No 2677-23-EP/26 (February 2026), the ECC held that, by virtue of the supplementary applica- tion of general procedural principles, arbitral tribunals required by its nature; and • its evaluation in the award.
may determine and apply the relevant legal frame- work, even where it has been wrongly invoked by the parties or has not been invoked at all. In reaching this conclusion, the ECC examined the relationship between the dispositive principle and iura novit curia under Ecuadorian law. It recalled that ordi- nary adjudicators must decide within the boundaries set by the parties’ claims and defences, while retain- ing some power to correct certain legal errors and apply the appropriate legal framework, provided they do not alter the underlying facts or grant relief beyond what was sought. In this context, the ECC clarified that iura novit curia – which is adapted as iura novit arbiter – operates with greater flexibility in arbitration, allowing arbitral tribunals to analyse the legal nature of the dispute, assess the evidence, correct legal char- acterisations, and determine the applicable law. In the ECC’s view, this entails a “slight development” of the aforenoted principle, in so far as it permits a relative relaxation of the dispositive principle, consistent with the flexible nature of arbitral proceedings, and does not, per se, give rise to a violation of due process. Ex Post Judicial Review In Ecuador, arbitral awards are not subject to appeal, but only to exceptional mechanisms of ex post judicial review. In particular, Ecuadorian law recognises two principal avenues for judicial control: • the annulment action, provided for in Article 31 of the Arbitration Act; and • the extraordinary protection action – a remedy of constitutional nature – governed by the Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitu- tional Control ( Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdic- cionales y Control Constitucional – LOGJCC). The annulment action constitutes the “ordinary” mechanism of judicial review of arbitral awards. Juris- diction lies with the President of the Provincial Court of the place where the award was rendered, acting as annulment judge, and the grounds for such an action are strictly limited to the following five set out in Article 31 of the Arbitration Act:
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