NEPAL Law and Practice Contributed by: Purna Man Shakya, Prakrit Shrestha and Dechen Gurung, Reliance Law Firm
are subject to the same 30-day route and finality. Nor does an appeal suspend the tribunal’s authority: under Section 16 (6), the tribunal may continue the proceed - ings and render its decision on the merits while the appeal remains pending. The courts’ underlying posture is one of restraint, grounded in a broader judicial view of the tribunal’s institutional role. In Department of Roads (NKP 2020, DN 10645), the Supreme Court affirmed that an arbi - tral tribunal, as a specialised body of experts selected by mutual agreement of the parties, functions as “a court of its own kind” once the parties have accepted its jurisdiction and is the primary adjudicator of both factual and jurisdictional questions. Nepali courts have accordingly declined to treat post- award challenges under Section 30 as an opportunity to re-examine the facts or merits of a tribunal’s deci - sion, as doing so would undermine the Act’s purpose of providing a fast, self-contained mechanism outside Nepali law confines the right to challenge an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to a specific window within the arbitration itself, rather than at will. A jurisdictional objection must be filed with the tribu - nal no later than the deadline for objecting to the claim under Section 14 (2), ordinarily 30 days from receipt of the claim, unless the parties agree otherwise (Section 16 (4)). Once the tribunal rules on the matter, either party may appeal to the High Court within 30 days (Section 16 (2)). There is no separate avenue for raising a jurisdictional challenge for the first time after the award is rendered. A party that failed to object, and did not appeal a rul - ing when made, is generally confined to a set-aside application under Section 30, where lack of jurisdic - tion remains an available, if overlapping, ground (Sec - tion 30 (2)(c)). The Supreme Court has gone further, applying a sub - stantive waiver principle against parties who sit on their rights. In Department of Roads (NKP 2020, DN 10645), the petitioner argued that proceedings had the ordinary court system. 5.3 Timing of Challenge
breached a 14-day contractual time limit for initiat - ing dispute resolution, yet it had itself ignored the respondent’s repeated requests to appoint an adju - dicator, later accepted a court-ordered appointment, and participated throughout without objection. The Court held it could not raise that ground for the first time after the award was rendered. This case illustrates that a party’s conduct during arbi - tration, not only the formal timing rules, can deter - mine whether a jurisdictional objection survives to the award stage. 5.4 Standard of Judicial Review for Jurisdiction/Admissibility The Arbitration Act does not articulate a separate, codified standard of review, such as “de novo” or “deferential”, for jurisdiction and admissibility ques - tions. An appeal under Section 16 (2) has historically involved a full, independent review of the tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling, since the statute gives the High Court the final word. More recent developments point towards a markedly more deferential posture. The 2025 amendment’s Section 30 (4) bars the High Court from re-evaluating evidence or the mer - its when hearing a set-aside application, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s characterisation of the review - ing court’s role as correctional rather than original in Krishna Chandra Jha (NKP 2009, DN 8128). Kanchanjunga Tamang JV (NKP 2024, DN 11322) con - firms this directly. The Supreme Court held that the reviewing court may not examine an award as though hearing an appeal on the merits and may intervene only where a serious error of law is apparent on the face of the record. Even on remand, it must identify the specific ground relied upon under Section 30 (1) and may not reassess the tribunal’s factual findings, since doing so would exceed its supervisory jurisdic - tion. This extends the “error of law” ground beyond the bare statutory language, without expanding the court’s role into a merits review. An award may additionally be set
aside where it is: • affected by bias;
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