POLAND Trends and Developments Contributed by: Justyna Kucia, Katarzyna Paczuska-Tokarska, Barnaba Skibniewski and Anna Tujakowska, Sołtysiński Kawecki & Szlęzak
infringe, to any degree, upon the principles so estab - lished. On the contrary, the subject of the examination should be whether the ultimate result (the substance of the arbitral award) violates the fundamental prin - ciples of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. In this regard, it is primarily the decision itself that should be assessed, rather than the correctness of the proceedings leading to its issuance. Furthermore, the mere objective incorrectness of an arbitral award does not automatically lead to the necessity of setting it aside – on the contrary, this is the case only where the removal of such defect is necessary on grounds of public policy. An erroneous interpretation of a contract by the arbitral tribunal, in the view of the state court, and an erroneous assessment of the claims arising therefrom do not, in and of themselves, constitute a violation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the mere inaccuracy of an arbitral award does not mean that the public policy clause permits its setting aside. Binding effect of arbitral awards (II CSKP 48/22, 24 April 2024) The Supreme Court confirmed that a recognised or enforced arbitral award binds subsequent arbitral tri - bunals deciding disputes between the same parties. However, this binding effect is limited strictly to the operative part (disposition) of the award and does not extend to prejudicial findings made in the prior proceedings. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that res judicata applies only to the final ruling, not the reason - ing that led to it. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court also addressed whether erroneous application of interest provisions by an arbitral tribunal could jus - tify setting aside the award on public policy grounds. Given that rules on statutory interest are relatively non- mandatory, breaches typically fall outside the scope of public policy. The Supreme Court confirmed that different assessment of the maturity of the claimant’s claim by the arbitral tribunal, and consequently the
date from which the claimant could demand interest, cannot lead to the setting aside of the award. It is inadmissible to examine whether the arbitral tribunal properly resolved the case in terms of facts and law. Even an incorrect interpretation of the provisions on limitation or preclusion by the arbitral tribunal is not considered a violation of the fundamental principles of the legal order. Formal defects in arbitral awards (II CSKP 283/24, 19 September 2024) The Supreme Court confirmed that the public policy allows for the review of an arbitral award only to a lim- ited extent – ie, if the arbitral award were to produce an effect inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the national legal order. It is inappropriate to exam - ine whether the challenged award was correct from the perspective of substantive law or whether it was issued in accordance with the appropriate procedural rules. In that context, the Supreme Court ruled that an arbitral tribunal’s failure to label an award as “partial” in the formal heading did not constitute a breach of public policy. The operative part clearly indicated its preliminary nature, rendering the omission a technical defect. Accordingly, the motion to set aside the award was dismissed. Autonomy and expert evidence (II CSKP 2097/22, 12 December 2024) The Supreme Court reaffirmed its pro-arbitration stance by upholding an arbitral tribunal’s decision to rely on a tribunal-appointed expert to determine a price adjustment, even though the parties had con - tractually assigned this task to a third-party auditor. The arbitral tribunal admitted the expert evidence after the claimant had obtained a unilateral audit without the respondent’s involvement. The Supreme Court held that this did not infringe the principle of party autonomy, a fundamental element of Polish public policy.
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