SINGAPORE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Koh Swee Yen, Joel Quek, Alessa Pang and Andre Soh, WongPartnership LLP
tect the integrity of the arbitral process, in the context of tribunal “copying”. This year (2026) also saw the Singapore courts consider the limits on a party’s abil - ity to re-open matters already determined by the tribu - nal at the enforcement stage. The SGCA considered this issue in ONI Global Pte Ltd and another v GNC Holdings LLC and another appeal [2026] SGCA(I) 3, which arose from the enforcement in Singapore of a Pittsburgh-seated award in a franchise dispute. The franchisee argued that the franchisor’s deletion of relevant evidence amounted to fraud on the tribunal, rendering enforcement contrary to Singapore public policy. The SGCA accepted that an award materially obtained by fraud, including procedural fraud such as the concealment or suppression of material evidence, falls within the public policy exception, and that the enforcement court must make its own assessment. However, where the alleged misconduct related to the procedural conduct of the arbitration, was fully known to and canvassed before the tribunal, and was ruled upon by the tribunal, the court should exercise “the greatest caution possible” before re-litigating it. The court explained that the materiality of concealed evidence is to be assessed by reference to how the tri - bunal would have decided in the absence of the mis - conduct. The tribunal, being intimately familiar with the evidence, is best placed to undertake that enquiry. In the absence of fresh evidence not before the tribu - nal, or an impermissible flaw in the tribunal’s process such as a breach of natural justice, there is typically no room for the court to substitute its own view of materiality. Since the tribunal had fully addressed the deletion of evidence and elected to cure it by draw - ing a limited adverse inference, there was no basis to disturb that determination. The decision also addressed impermissible “hedg - ing”. Building on China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLP [2020] SGCA 12, the court held that a party who objects to a procedural irregularity, yet nonetheless addresses the impugned case on its merits without making clear what reme - dial steps it considers necessary, cannot later rely on that irregularity to resist enforcement. In the arbitra - tion, the franchisee had applied to strike out a new quantum case but had also argued it on the merits,
while keeping its objection in reserve. This amounted to impermissible hedging: a party cannot present itself as ready, able and willing to proceed to an award, only to challenge that award once it proves unfavourable. On the scope of submission and natural justice, the SGCA also clarified that a tribunal tasked with admin - istering equitable relief is not confined to granting relief in the precise terms sought, and that detailed terms crafted to balance competing equities can be a “reasonably foreseeable” outcome that gives rise to no breach of the fair hearing rule. Applying the cumu - lative requirements in Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] SGCA 28, the court overturned the SICC’s refusal to enforce parts of the order for specific performance, holding that there had been no breach of natural justice. Jurisdiction, Admissibility and the Parties to the Arbitration Agreement A recurring theme in the past year’s jurisprudence was the question of who may arbitrate, and on what conditions. The Singapore courts continued to apply and consider the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility. Pre-arbitral conditions: jurisdiction or admissibility? In DRO v DRP [2025] SGHC 255, the GDHC had to consider whether a clause requiring parties to attempt amicable resolution was a condition precedent to the commencement of arbitration, and if so, whether this went to the admissibility of a claim or the tribu - nal’s jurisdiction. The GDHC held that a precondition to arbitration goes to admissibility, not jurisdiction. Firstly, this is consistent with the distinction between jurisdiction (ie,the power of the tribunal to hear the case) and admissibility (ie, whether it is appropriate for the tribunal to hear it). Secondly, this was in line with obiter dicta in a previous decision of the Court of Appeal. Thirdly, this would be consistent with the general consensus in international arbitration that pre - conditions to arbitration should be treated as matters of admissibility rather than jurisdiction. On the facts, the GDHC found that the relevant clause was not a condition precedent to arbitration, and in any event strict compliance had been waived.
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