Merger Control 2026

EU Law and Practice Contributed by: Porter Elliott, Catherine Gordley and Niharika Parshurampuria, Van Bael & Bellis

mission will publish in the Official Journal and on its website when the notification is filed. The Commission has a legal obligation not to dis - close any confidential information obtained during the course of the merger review process, including during pre-notification, and takes this duty very seriously. 7.4 Co-Operation With Other Jurisdictions The Commission routinely co-operates with member state NCAs and other national competition authorities worldwide. Within the EU/EEA The Commission co-operates with member states through the European Competition Network (ECN). It provides the NCAs with copies of notifications, proposed remedies and any other major documents submitted by the parties. The Commission must con - sult an Advisory Committee made up of NCA repre - sentatives before it takes a decision following a Phase II review or any decision imposing fines, but is not bound by the Committee’s opinion. The Commission and NCAs also participate in an EU Merger Working Group, with the aim of increasing consistency and co- operation in the merger control process. The Commission will also consult the EFTA Surveil - lance Authority where a transaction is likely to have significant effects in the EFTA states. Other Authorities The Commission routinely co-operates with other competition authorities. It must obtain a confidential - ity waiver from the parties in order to share information with a non-EEA competition authority. Bilateral co-operation The Commission has entered into a number of co- operation agreements and memorandums of under - standing with various competition authorities, includ - ing those of the USA, Canada, Japan, China, South Korea and Brazil. The EU and UK signed the EU–UK Competition Cooperation Agreement in February 2026. The degree of co-operation these arrange - ments envisage varies. Historically, the Commission has had a very close relationship with the US compe - tition authorities (the Federal Trade Commission and

the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division), and in practice the authorities have generally tried to align their positions where possible, although divergence does occur. There is some evidence to suggest that the relationship between the Commission and its US counterparts has become less close during the sec - The Commission also plays an active role in the Merg - er Working Group of the International Competition Network (ICN). 8. Appeals and Judicial Review 8.1 Access to Appeal and Judicial Review Commission merger decisions can be appealed to the General Court for annulment on procedural or sub - stantive grounds under Article 263 of the TFEU. The General Court’s rulings may be further appealed to the Court of Justice on points of law. 8.2 Typical Timeline for Appeals An application for annulment may be lodged by the notifying parties or any other sufficiently interested third party (see 7.1 Third-Party Rights ). Such actions must be filed within two months and ten days of: • the date of notification of the decision (if filed by an addressee of the decision); or • the date the party is made aware of the decision (if filed by a third party). ond Trump administration. Multilateral co-operation It normally takes two to three years for the General Court to issue a judgment. However, an expedited procedure is available, which can shorten the time - line to less than a year. The court has discretion about whether to use the expedited process and will tend to do so where the parties can show urgency and where the case revolves around a small number of clear legal issues. The General Court is willing to engage in a rigorous review of Commission decisions, although the Com - mission enjoys a considerable margin of deference, particularly in matters involving complex economic analyses. Ultimately, only around 20 Commission

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