FINLAND Law and Practice Contributed by: Anna-Stéphanie Roubier, Johanna Kauppinen and Milja Vuopio, HPP Attorneys Ltd
4.2 Markets Affected by a Transaction The parties must identify in the notification any prod - ucts and/or services that they offer where the market share thresholds laid down in the Government Decree on the scope of the obligation to notify (920/2022) are met. The parties must explain in the notification why they consider these products and/or services to be relevant in this context. Affected market(s) exist, where a concentration gives rise to: • horizontal overlaps in a market where at least two of the parties (including any undertakings in the respective corporate groups) operate, and where the combined market share exceeds 20% of the Finnish market or a relevant part thereof; and • vertical effects in a market where one of the parties (including any undertaking(s) in the same corporate group) holds a market share of at least 30%, and that market is upstream or downstream of a market where another party (including any undertaking(s) in the same corporate group) operates. Information also needs to be provided for reportable markets. These are markets where the parties have horizontal overlaps and/or vertical links but the market share thresholds for affected markets are not met. Further, information needs to be provided for markets where the concentration may give rise to significant effects. These include any market that is not an affect - ed market, but where: • one party has a market share of at least 30%, and another party is a potential competitor on that same market; • one party has a market share of at least 30%, and another party owns or controls important immate - rial rights on that same market; and • the parties operate on closely related (but not the same) markets, and the parties’ individual or combined market shares on any of these markets exceed 30%. Information must be given for any market on which at least one party (including any undertakings in the same corporate group) generates turnover. According
to the FCCA’s Guidelines, this information is needed to provide an overview of how the aforementioned markets relate to other markets, and to provide infor - mation about possible conglomerate effects. It follows that a market share below which competitive concerns are considered unlikely is 20% in case of horizontal overlaps. In all other instances, competition concerns are considered unlikely, provided that the market share of no party exceeds 30%. 4.3 Reliance on Case Law The FCCA and the Market Court regularly rely on prec - edents, and they refer to the European Commission’s decisions and the CJEU’s judgments. At times, the FCCA also relies on decisional practice by relevant authorities from other EU member states and the Unit - ed Kingdom. It should, however, be noted that the FCCA does not consider itself bound by market defi - nitions applied in prior cases, as the relevant markets (product/services and the geographic extent) defini - tion is case-specific (to the extent that this is required.) 4.4 Competition Concerns According to the FCCA’s Guidelines, the FCCA usually analyses a concentration’s effects on market struc - tures and its potential for anti-competitive effects. The FCCA begins its analysis by examining the changes to market structures in the relevant markets that are likely to result from the concentration. The potential anti-competitive effects can be divided into two broad conceptual categories: co-ordinated and non-coordi - nated effects. A horizontal concentration can significantly impede effective competition when it has non-coordinated (unilateral) effects. The concentration can remove, or reduce, important competitive constraints on one or several undertakings, resulting in a significant impedi - ment to effective competitionwithout undertakings expressly, or even tacitly, co-ordinating their opera - tions. A horizontal concentration can also induce so-called co-ordinated effects (often referred to as a “collective dominant position”). A concentration can result in changes to competitive dynamics, which can significantly impede effective competition by increas - ing the likelihood of previously independent undertak - ings starting to co-ordinate their market behaviour to
215 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook