SWEDEN Trends and Developments Contributed by: Ulrica Salomon, Johanna Elveland, Christian Wennergren and Matteus Romare, Cirio Advokatbyrå AB
The remedies were subject to conditional fines of SEK300 million (approximately EUR27 million) for Strålfors and SEK450 million (approximately EUR41 million) for PostNord, as well as periodic penalty pay - ments of SEK20 million (approximately EUR1.8 mil - lion) for each month the remedies are not fulfilled. The remedies are to remain in force until 2038. The case illustrates the importance of maintaining an active dialogue with the SCA throughout the review process. The case also shows that behavioural rem - edies may be considered efficient in certain cases to address competition concerns raised by the SCA. Below-threshold merger enforcement Normally, a concentration must be notified to the SCA where: • the combined aggregate turnover in Sweden of all undertakings concerned exceeded SEK1 billion (approximately EUR90,4 million) in the preceding financial year; and • at least two of the undertakings each achieved turnover in Sweden exceeding SEK200 million (approximately EUR18 million) during that year. If the first threshold is met but not the second, the SCA may still order a party of the concentration to notify the concentration if there are “particular grounds”. This rule reflects the SCA’s so-called “call-in pow - ers”, which allow the SCA to “call in” certain transac - tions that do not trigger the mandatory notification thresholds. In order to mitigate the risk of a call-in, the parties may voluntarily file a transaction once the first threshold is met. Concentrations falling below both thresholds may, in certain circumstances, also be subject to review by the SCA. According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in particular the Towercast judgement, an acquisition that falls below the merger control thresholds – and thus does not require review under merger control rules – may never - theless constitute an abuse of dominant position and be prohibited as such. According to the Towercast judgement, such a review may take place where the buyer has a dominant position, if the target operates in the same markets as the buyer and the degree of
dominance reached through the concentration sub - stantially impedes competition. In 2025, the SCA concluded its first so-called Tower - cast case. The SCA was informed of a transaction in which the owners of Retriever Aktiebolag (“Retriever”) and Infomedia A/S (“Infomedia”) simultaneously trans - ferred all their shares in their respective companies to a newly established holding company. The transaction did not trigger the mandatory notification thresholds and was not eligible for a call-in, so the SCA assessed it as a potential abuse of dominant position under the Towercast doctrine. The SCA noted that Retriever, active in the media monitoring market in Sweden, was the largest provider by turnover, and that the transaction would effectively have left Retriever without competitive pressure from Infomedia. In parallel with the SCA’s investigation, the Norwegian Competition Authority assessed the trans - action’s effects on the Norwegian market under its merger control rules. In Norway, the transaction was approved in July 2025, subject to commitments from the holding company, which primarily required it to divest Infomedia Norge AS. The case in Sweden closed in November 2025 with - out intervention; however, it highlights the competition law risks associated with mergers involving dominant undertakings, and that a merger is not free from scru - tiny merely because it is not subject to notification requirements. Extended deadline for review of concentration for exceptional reasons Another case is Hypergene AB’s (“Hypergene”) noti - fied acquisition of Stratsys AB (“Stratsys”). A Phase II investigation was initiated in February 2026, and on 11 March, the SCA decided to extend the review deadline without the parties’ consent, citing “exceptional rea - sons” under Chapter 4 Section 14, second paragraph, of the Swedish Competition Act. In its decision, the SCA stated, inter alia, that information obtained during the investigation suggested that parts of the notifica - tion contained inaccuracies and presented a mislead - ing picture of the horizontal overlaps between the par - ties’ activities and their respective market positions.
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