CHILE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Francisca Levin, Benjamín Torres, María Paz Dulanto and Antonia Silva, Cuatrecasas
role of remedies as a central tool in Chile’s maturing merger control regime. Confirmation of the Criteria for Providing False Information in Merger Control Notifications In recent months, two highly significant rulings con - cerning the provision of false information in merger control proceedings were issued by the Supreme Court and the TDLC, plus two out-of-court settle - ments that were approved by the latter. These deci - sions constitute the first cases in Chile addressing this specific procedural infringement in the context of merger control, thereby providing much-awaited guidance on the scope and content of the duty of truthfulness imposed on notifying parties when filing a transaction for the FNE’s review. The rulings clari - fied that the legal concept of “false information” is not restricted to openly untrue, misleading or altered documents, but also covers providing inaccurate information, concealing information or failing to pro - vide information that was held by the notifying parties when filing. However, while such rulings have reinforced the duties of transparency and good faith that should inspire the entire filing procedure, some doubts remain as to what is the real burden on the notifying parties when notify - ing a concentration. Particularly, what the boundaries of the notion of “internal documents” are when filing a transaction, such as whether drafts of documents or non-final documents should be included, and how merging parties can prevent possible infringements in this area are not yet clear. In June 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the fine imposed by the TDLC against TWDC Enterprises 18 Corp. (Disney’s holding) for providing false information when notifying the acquisition of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., equivalent to approx. USD4.3 million. This case was initiated by an FNE claim, after it condition - ally cleared the transaction in 2019. The Supreme Court upheld the TDLC’s decision that Disney infringed competition law by providing false information, understood as concealing several internal presentations held by the company when filing the transaction to the FNE. The FNE praised the deci - sion, highlighting that the judgment represents a key
milestone for the effective functioning of the merger control system and sends a clear deterrent signal to market participants, underscoring that the provision will be enforced and that any attempt to underreport or misrepresent information during a merger notifica - tion will be sanctioned. In the same vein, in November 2025, the TDLC upheld the FNE’s claim against Cadena Comercial Andina for providing false information when notifying its acquisi - tion of OK Market in 2021, imposing a fine of approx. USD2.5 million. Similar considerations to the Disney case were applied. The relevant parameter clarified by the TDLC was that underreported documents do not need to be decisive or material to the decision or need to be able to change the FNE’s decision when clear - ing the transaction (in contrast to the European Com - mission’s standard on misleading information cases). The Supreme Court’s judicial review of this decision is currently pending. Finally, in January 2026, the TDLC approved two out-of-court settlements reached by the FNE with CJ Cheiljedang Corporation (CJ) and Bunge Alimentos (Bunge) regarding the submission of false informa - tion when notifying the acquisition of control of CJ’s subsidiaries by Bunge, in the soy protein concentrate market in Chile. The settlements established a pay - ment of USD1.2 million shared equally between the companies, alongside compliance obligations for Bunge. This agreement marks the first time in which the FNE has reached an out-of-court settlement regarding submission of false information when noti - fying a concentration, reinforcing compliance with the merger regulation. Legislative Initiatives on a Potential FDI Screening Regime Chile currently does not have in place a foreign direct investment (FDI) screening regime nor foreign sub - sidies legislation that evaluates cross-border invest - ments, as explained in 9. Foreign Direct Investment/ Subsidies Review in the Law & Practice article. In other words, there is no requirement for separate fil - ings or approvals beyond those required under the Chilean merger control rules for foreign investment specifically, other than post-closing registration for - malities before the Central Bank of Chile. However,
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