Private Wealth 2026

USA – OKLAHOMA Law and Practice Contributed by: Aaron Bundy and Danya Bundy, Bundy

blended families are a consistent accelerant, with stepparent and stepchildren conflicts surfacing at the first death rather than the second. Non-probate transfers are a growing share of the fights, since beneficiary designations, joint accounts, payable-on- death arrangements, and transfer-on-death instru - ments move wealth outside the will and are frequently changed late in life under circumstances relatives find suspicious. Fiduciary litigation is also rising. Beneficiaries have become more willing to demand accountings and to challenge trustee investment concentration, fee practices, self-dealing, and communication failures, and the new Uniform Trust Code’s reporting duties will accelerate the trend, because beneficiaries who receive annual statements ask annual questions. Guardianship proceedings are increasingly used as pre-death inheritance litigation, with family members contesting control of an elder and the elder’s assets. Mineral wealth generates its own disputes over man - agement and division of fractional interests, and com - mon law marriage adds an Oklahoma-specific front, since a putative spouse can appear in probate claim - ing the full marital package. Courts push these mat - ters toward mediation, and most resolve there, but the cases that try are harder fought and better funded than a decade ago. 5.2 Mechanism for Compensation Wealth disputes proceed in the district courts, which have full legal and equitable powers. A fiduciary who breaches duties may be surcharged for losses caused, required to disgorge profits, removed, and denied compensation. Courts impose constructive trusts and trace assets into the hands of wrongdoers and their transferees, which is often the difference between a judgment and a recovery. Where misconduct sounds in tort, punitive damages may be available under 23 O.S. Section 9.1 upon clear and convincing proof of reckless disregard or malice, with caps that climb as culpability rises. Attorney fees follow statute and equity, and fee shift - ing is a live risk for fiduciaries who litigate self-inter - estedly with estate or trust funds, which courts refuse to charge to the estate. The rationales are restoration and deterrence. The remedies aim to put beneficiaries

where proper administration would have put them and to remove any economic incentive for a fiduciary to prefer personal interest over duty. 6. Roles and Responsibilities of Fiduciaries 6.1 Prevalence of Corporate Fiduciaries Corporate fiduciaries are well established in Okla - homa. Bank trust departments and independent trust companies administer a substantial share of the state’s trust wealth, regulated by the Oklahoma State Banking Department or, for national institutions, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Families commonly pair a corporate trustee’s administrative and investment discipline with an individual co-trus - tee’s family knowledge. Professional fiduciaries are held to an elevated stand - ard. Under the Oklahoma Uniform Prudent Investor Act, a trustee with special skills or expertise, or one named in reliance on a representation of special skills, has a duty to use those skills. A trust company that advertises fiduciary expertise will be judged against what it advertised, not against what an ordinary pru - dent person would have done. 6.2 Fiduciary Liabilities A trust is not an entity whose veil must be pierced in the corporate sense. Trustees are personally respon - sible for their own breaches of duty, and beneficiaries may pursue surcharge directly, so the practical ques - tion is not veil piercing but the scope of trustee liability and the tools for limiting it. Trust creditors are gener - ally limited to trust assets when the trustee contracts properly in a fiduciary capacity, while a trustee who fails to disclose the fiduciary capacity can be person - ally bound. Exculpatory clauses are enforceable within limits. They are construed strictly, particularly when the trus - tee drafted the instrument, and no clause will protect bad faith, reckless indifference, self-dealing, or fraud. Delegation is a second protective mechanism. A trus - tee who prudently selects a professional investment agent, defines the scope of the engagement, moni - tors performance, and documents that review shifts

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