NETHERLANDS Trends and Developments Contributed by: Sebastiaan Bennink, Daniel Webb, Carlijn Raijmakers and Matilde Muriotto, Bennink Dunin-Wasowicz
The likely operational requirements will be familiar from the anti-money laundering context, including internal sanctions policies, client and UBO screen - ing, mapping of ownership and control structures, and compliance with reporting obligations. However, the reporting obligations applicable to lawyers will be subject to exceptions designed to protect the core functions of the profession. In particular, they will not apply to lawyer-client communications in connection with pending or prospective judicial proceedings. In addition, the bill preserves strict confidentiality rules for both the BFT and the Dean, reflecting the sensitiv - ity of supervisory information obtained in relation to these professions. Observations on the limitations of the current proposal The case for modernisation is not seriously contest - ed, and the bill has been broadly welcomed. Three aspects of the proposal have nevertheless attracted sustained criticism during the consultation and parlia - mentary stages, and each remains unresolved in the June 2026 draft. Unclear delineation between administrative and criminal enforcement The introduction of a dual system comprising both criminal and administrative enforcement is one of the most consequential features of the proposed Inter - national Sanctions Act, and has attracted broad sup - port in principle as a way of closing the enforcement gap left by a purely criminal model. Concerns persist, however, that the proposal says too little about how the two tracks will operate alongside one another in practice. The central difficulty of the proposed model is that the bill does not state with sufficient clarity which infringe - ments will normally be dealt with administratively, which will remain reserved for criminal enforcement, or by what criteria that allocation is to be made. This matters not only for institutional efficiency but also for legal certainty: a system in which it is unclear which authority will act, under which procedure and with which sanctioning logic risks producing fragmenta - tion rather than flexibility.
The differing roles of the supervisory bodies desig - nated by the bill illustrate the point. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), for instance, are expected to continue focus - ing primarily on systemic supervision, rather than the investigation of sanction breaches, suggesting that, in the financial sector, criminal enforcement may remain the principal route for sanctions enforcement. The cre - ation of administrative powers does not, in any event, guarantee that they will be used. Enforcement powers were already conferred on the Dutch Customs Author - ity under the Sanctiewet 1977, yet they are reported to have been used only sparingly. A related concern is the risk of overlap: the same underlying conduct may trigger parallel or successive proceedings on both tracks. Parliamentary debate has accordingly focused on the principle of ne bis in idem, highlighting that the lack of clear delimita - tion between these two enforcement systems leaves unresolved how these different tracks should relate to one another and which instrument should take priority in cases of overlap. Additional questions have been raised about the deterrent quality and practical effectiveness of the administrative track itself, especially in relation to the use of administrative fines. Based on the latest ver - sion of the proposal, the maximum administrative fine for sanctions violations will be the amount set for the fifth category in Article 23 (4) of the Dutch Criminal Code ( Wetboek van Strafrecht ), which corresponds to EUR110,000 at the time of writing. That ceiling may be adequate for smaller operators, but it is difficult to see why a turnover-based model was not adopted for large undertakings. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 requires penalties for legal persons to be effective, proportion - ate and dissuasive, and fixes the minimum level of the maximum fine by reference to worldwide turnover (Article 7 (1) and (2)); Dutch criminal law itself already contemplates turnover-based fines for legal persons (Article 23 (7) of the Criminal Code). Against that back - ground, a fixed ceiling of this order is unlikely to be dissuasive for a large corporate group. Taken together, these criticisms do not necessarily undermine the case for administrative enforcement as such, which is arguably necessary in a sanctions
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