AUSTRALIA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Dennis Miralis, Jack Dennis, Phillip Salakas and Jessica Semsarian, Nyman Gibson Miralis
Afghanistan On 6 December 2025, the Australian Government established what it has called a “World-first” autono - mous sanctions framework for Afghanistan to “hold the Taliban to account”. The framework is to comple- ment the United Nations Security Council’s Taliban regime (UNSC resolution 1988 (2011)). The sanctions framework consists of individual des- ignations, an arms embargo, a prohibition on supply- ing arms or related materials and any related services or activities to Afghanistan. Under this framework, the Minister can make a designation for engaging in, being responsible for or being complicit in any of the following: • the oppression of women and girls in Afghanistan; • the oppression of minority groups in Afghanistan; • the general oppression of people in Afghanistan; • undermining good governance or the rule of law in Afghanistan. This exemplifies the ongoing approach to establish - ing a new framework, with DFAT having conducted a public consultation on its introduction in October 2025. At the announcement, the Minister designated four individuals as the first to be listed under this new framework. No further listings have been made. The “new” vessel framework There are two other new entries on the Consolidated List: the vessel autonomous framework and the Iran UNSC sanctions. The first was established in June 2025, when Australia imposed sanctions on 60 ves - sels of Russia’s “shadow fleet”. The Minister of For - eign Affairs did so by regulation 8 of the Sanctions Regulations, rather than by creating a new framework in and of itself. Thematic regimes continue There has been a gradual, marked decrease in the use of thematic sanctions regimes since their inception. Since July 2025, the Government has imposed only four sanctions under the cyber framework and seven under the human rights framework. The former were imposed on 20 November 2025, marking the fifth time Australia activated the cyber framework.
The latter was undertaken yet again in conjunction with other countries and marks one of only a few instances in which the human rights framework has been used. When the Magnitsky-style sanctions were introduced, the Australian Government highlighted it would “bring us into line with key like-minded partners”, who were “increasingly using thematic sanctions to respond flexibly to issues of international concern, regardless of geographic location”. From the start, their use was largely aimed towards alignment with “like-minded” countries; however, Australia can act independently of these countries or at least take a leading role. The promise of flexible use for “issues of international concern” falls short. The limited use of these frame- works, despite extensive reports of human rights abuses and corruption across the globe, suggests that the Australian Government is still working out where these tools fit within its arsenal. The sparing use also suggests that other foreign policy objec- tives and national interests are coming into play. The international community and order have undergone major changes throughout the last few years. As these changes occur and lines are redrawn, so too may Aus- tralia’s approach to sanctions and its national interests that restrain them. Increase in Regulatory Guidance Notes Over the last 12 months, the Australian Sanctions Office has released 12 new guidance and advisory notes and updated another. This guidance covers the following topics: • mining and machinery export sectors; • humanitarian sector; • securities and investment sectors; • sanctions and proliferation financing; • cyber risks of DPRK IT workers to Australian busi - nesses; • Russian contracts aimed at circumventing sanc- tions; • sanctions circumvention using cryptocurrency; • sanctions risk in the export of drones and drone components to Russia; • sanctions risks from misuse of AI and new tech- nologies;
25 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook