SWITZERLAND Trends and Developments Contributed by: Philippe M. Reich, Kaspar Projer, Samantha Salsench and Anna Zellweger, Baker McKenzie Switzerland AG
Baker McKenzie Switzerland AG Holbeinstrasse 30
8034 Zurich Switzerland
Tel: +41 44 384 14 14 Fax: +41 44 384 12 84 Email: zurich.info@bakermckenzie.com Web: www.bakermckenzie.com/en/locations/emea/switzerland
Swiss Policy Considerations For many years, Switzerland was not considered a key player from a global sanctions compliance per - spective, ignoring the fact that (i) more than 80% of Swiss companies export worldwide, and (ii) Switzer - land is the regional if not global trading hub for many multinationals, thus regularly automatically triggering the applicability of Swiss sanctions. This perception somewhat changed for the first time in 2011 with the adoption of stringent sanctions against Iran and of course in 2022 after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine when the Swiss government ultimately decided to implement EU sanctions, doing away with mere “anti- circumvention” measures adopted in 2014. By law, Switzerland cannot adopt unilateral sanctions. However, as a UN member state, it is (merely) obliged to implement the UN Security Council’s non-military coercive measures. Furthermore, Switzerland by now also regularly implements other broadly supported international sanctions, in particular those imposed by the EU. Switzerland adopts such sanctions autono - mously and in line with its foreign (economic) policy interest. Discussions in Switzerland and abroad often turn on whether and to what extent Switzerland can or should align with EU or even other western sanctions with mistaken concepts of Swiss neutrality. According to the law of neutrality, Switzerland must not participate in a war between states. This is reflected in the sanc - tions against Russia, whereby the sale or supply of war material or dual-use items for military purposes to Ukraine is also prohibited. However, the policy of
neutrality does not preclude Switzerland from align - ing with international sanctions condemning actions in (flagrant) violation of international law. With Swit - zerland being the host nation of the UN, the ICRC and many other (humanitarian) international organi - sations, the Swiss government is rather focussed on upholding the principles of international law, which frequently includes the implementation of international sanctions. This is consequently also reflected in the competent Swiss authority’s (SECO) endeavours to enforce sanctions, including their circumvention, more strictly. Swiss Enforcement Landscape Under Swiss sanctions jurisdiction, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) is responsible for the enforcement of the Federal Act on the Imple - mentation of International Sanctions (the “Embargo Act”), and of the individual sanctions ordinances enacted thereunder (eg, Article 32 of the Ukraine Ordinance). SECO does not publish any information on ongoing or concluded enforcement proceedings, nor does it pub - lish penalty orders. There are – still – only very limited court rulings available covering (potential) violations of Swiss sanctions, although we have seen an increase in the past year. The data available on the Swiss sanctions enforce - ment map originates from information provided by SECO in the context of parliamentary inquiries and on the occasion of public presentations. Moreover, a series of final administrative criminal decisions ren -
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