Sanctions 2026

UK Trends and Developments Contributed by: John Binns, BCL Solicitors LLP

The Emperor’s Coat Tails: The Value of UK Sanctions in a US-Dominated World The UK remains at the forefront of using sanctions to achieve its foreign policy goals. But in a world where those goals are prone to shift around a dominant US agenda, how can it continue to claim the moral high ground? The moral dimension Why (assuming it matters at all) should an ordinary citizen support the imposition of sanctions? Even in an era where values-driven foreign policy appears to be giving way to more nakedly self-serving agendas, governments rarely present sanctions as serving pure - ly economic or transitory objectives. Rather, they are presented as an expression of a nation’s values, of a desire to do “the right thing” on the international stage (and, on notable occasions, even domestically), and to respond to the misconduct of others. With nations, even allies, increasingly disagreeing on what “the right thing” is and what constitutes misconduct, this begs questions about how such claims to legitimacy are maintained, and how decisions are made about what measures are imposed, and against whom. For the UK, the use of sanctions in 2026 raises these questions in a particularly acute way, against a back - drop of: • its withdrawal from the European Union (EU) (“Brexit”), and the political instability that followed; • its continuing roles in the G7 and the UN Security Council, and as a global financial centre; • the disproportionate influence on global finance of its Crown Dependencies (CDs) and Overseas Ter - ritories (OTs); • the whiplash-inducing response of its political leaders to Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine; and • its relationships with key allies, including the US, in Iran and in the broader context of national and global instability. Democracy and distrust A key justification for many of the UK’s sanctions regimes, including against Russia and Iran, is the protection of democratic values and the rule of law. In moral terms, the citizens of the UK and its inter -

national allies might reasonably be assumed to hold such values dear, and, to some extent, they influence the government’s ability to speak with moral authority more generally. In a democratic state, the way mis - conduct is identified and dealt with (at least domesti - cally) is defined by criminal laws that can be made and unmade by the legislature, which reflects the views of citizens through elections. On the international stage, the positioning of a democratic state against authori - tarian or despotic governments, or against states where elections occur but are neither free nor fair, is often accompanied by a message that it is part of our role (that of the UK, Europe, and “the West”) to defend such values. An analysis of whether sanctions achieve that aim might usefully start with a reminder that those values are generally held to include: • the protection of private citizens’ rights (subject to proportionate restrictions), including to privacy, free speech the free enjoyment of property; • the rule of law, including the principle that criminal penalties should be based on clearly foreseeable prohibitions and imposed only after a fair trial; • the separation of powers between a state’s execu - tive, judicial and legislative branches, to protect against tyranny; and • the independence of the state’s law officers, press and professions. A more contested addition to that list might extend the notion of respecting the rule of law to an international context. At a minimum this might include respect for binding (though not universal) international agree - ments such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the latter guarantee - ing the important principle of freedom of navigation through international waterways. The more contro - versial aspects for some might include the investiga - tion of and enforcement against supranational crimes against humanity, especially via the International Criminal Court (ICC). Notably, the US’ position is (and was, even before the current administration) somewhat nuanced, as a signatory to the NPT (as is Iran) but not UNCLOS or

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