USA Law and Practice Contributed by: Irwin A. Kishner, Daniel A. Etna, Joel Wagman and Barry Werbin, Herrick, Feinstein LLP
The Sports Bribery Act is the federal criminal law that targets the manipulation of athletic competition. This act does not cover other non-bribery concerns such as extortion, blackmail, tipping of inside information or betting on games by someone who can affect the outcome. 1.3 Betting-Related Offences Across the USA, sports betting is part of popular sports culture, and many states have passed, and are continuing to pass, legislation to legalise sports betting in varying forms. Such forms include mobile sports betting with multiple sportsbooks options, one mobile betting option, in-person online betting (ie, proximity to brick-and-mortar sportsbooks) and only physical sportsbooks. Some states restrict sports bet - ting to only in-person betting, while others allow both in-person and mobile betting options. Of these states, more than half have authorised mobile betting, reflect - ing a significant shift in the accessibility and conveni - ence of sports wagering nationwide. Although the legalisation of sports betting continues to expand, it is now widely regarded as a new norm in the USA. This shift is evident in the dramatic increase in the volume of bets placed, with the annual amount wagered consistently setting new growth records year after year. The trend remained strong throughout 2025, with the total amount wagered in the USA projected to surpass USD160 billion (up from a noteworthy almost USD150 billion wagered in 2024), underscoring the rapid and ongoing boom in the sports betting industry. Also noteworthy are prediction markets, which most straightforwardly involve betting on the outcome of specific real‑world events. Prediction markets are not new; real‑money versions have existed since the Iowa Electronic Markets launched in 1988 (albeit with a more academic focus and small investment limits), but the 2025 boom (analysts estimate tens of bil - lions in global trading volume) pushed them into the mainstream and made them feel like sports betting wrapped in a stock‑market interface. Prediction mar - kets let people trade binary “Yes” or “No” contracts priced between a few cents and near USD1 that settle at USD1 if the outcome happens and USD0 if not, with the trading price functioning as an implied probabil - ity, on everything from game props to which brands
run Super Bowl ads. As popular platforms such as Kalshi and Polymarket grow, these markets offer use - ful real‑time sentiment signals while also attracting regulatory and insider‑trading scrutiny. Sports Governing Bodies Sharing Information With Betting Operators US sports leagues license their data to sports betting operators via exclusive or co-exclusive distributors to provide accurate, real-time data for an agreed- upon fee. Sportsbooks operate outside of the sports, but often license from the sports organisations, as opposed to a third-party organisation. Sports organi - sations benefit from the win-win of earning fees for the data collection already underway and protecting the integrity of the sports wagers by ensuring accu - rate results. Additionally, certain states such as Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia, for example, have imple - mented specific requirements under which operators are mandated to use official league data for certain types of bets. Most notably, these requirements apply to prop bets and in-play betting, further supporting the desire to preserve the integrity of betting activities in those jurisdictions. 1.4 Disciplinary Framework The steps taken by the different governing bodies of sports with respect to doping, integrity and betting offences vary by sport and violation. For example, pursuant to the Joint Drug Prevention and Treat - ment Program (the “JDPT Program”) of Major League Baseball (MLB), a player who tests positive for a performance-enhancing substance is subject to an 80-game suspension for a first violation, a 162-game suspension with 183 days of pay suspension for a second violation and potential permanent suspen - sion from major and minor league baseball for a third violation. This contrasts with other sporting bodies such as the National Football League (NFL), which, although having a shorter season, has slightly differ - ent punishments for similar violations. For example, a player who violates the NFL’s policy on performance- enhancing substances can be penalised, depending on the consumed substance, from anywhere between two and eight regular and/or postseason games for a first violation, between five and 17 regular and/or postseason games for a second violation and with a multiple-season suspension for a third violation.
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