JAPAN Trends and Developments Contributed by: Makoto Hattori, Rikita Karakawa, Wataru Takagishi and Taku Shibazaki, Abe, Ikubo & Katayama
• Causes of trade secret leakage (leakage channels) – external cyberattacks were the most common, at 36.6%, a sharp increase from 8.0% in the 2020 survey (the increase in leakage associated with ransomware attacks is considered a contribut - ing factor). Internal factors still account for a large share of major leakage channels, including leakage caused by current employees’ failure to comply with rules, at 32.6%; leakage motivated by spe - cific factors, such as monetary gain among current employees, at 31.5%; and leakage resulting from operational errors or misidentification by current employees, at 25.4%. • Status of trade secret leakage countermeasures – with respect to the divisional management of information, organisations that “distinguish trade secrets from other information” increased to 61.5% (from 53.3%). However, while the category “not distinguished” was only 9.2% for organisations with 301 or more employees, it reached 35.5% for those with 300 or fewer, making it clear that there is significant room for improvement in small and medium-sized organisations. • Trade secret management in the supply chain – only 44.9% of companies grasped the manage - ment status of their direct business partners. The percentage of companies stating that there is “no interaction itself” (regarding confidential informa - tion) also rose to 36.8% (an increase from 20.9% in the previous survey). This suggests a growing risk that companies may be providing trade secrets to their partners without correctly identifying them as such, potentially leading to leaks of those trade secrets from the business partners. 4. Revision of the Trade Secret Management Guidelines The Trade Secret Management Guidelines were for - mulated in 2003 by the METI, which is responsible for the administration of the UCPA, to establish protection requirements for trade secrets, and they serve as an important guide for companies to appropriately pro - tect and utilise trade secrets. In March 2025, the METI revised the Trade Secret Management Guidelines for the first time in approximately six years. The revision was made against the backdrop of the spread of remote work, increased labour mobility, the advance - ment of information management premised on cloud
technology, and the accumulation of judicial prece - dents, and is intended to promote the clarification and systematisation of the requirements for information to qualify as a trade secret. • Use of generative AI and maintenance of “Secrecy Management“ – the revised guidelines set forth a specific approach to determining whether legal protection is available when trade secrets are input into generative AI (particularly external services). First, it is clarified that, where secret information is input into an external AI service and is used for AI training, and the system is left configured so that such information may be output in response to queries from third parties (ie, in a reusable state), this may be regarded as indicating ” lack of intent to maintain the information as a secret”, and the requirement of secrecy management may be denied. In contrast, it is determined that, if the secret information is used under a corporate contract where non-use for training is guaranteed, or under training exclusion (opt-out) settings, it cannot be said that secrecy management is immediately lost solely by the fact of input. Fur - thermore, it is stated that secrecy management is not immediately denied solely by the fact that the information was generated or output from genera - tive AI, and emphasis is placed on whether secrecy management is maintained within the management unit. Nevertheless, if the information is not confined within the company but is provided to a third party outside the company (eg, a generative AI pro - vider), secrecy management may be denied, so the contract terms, settings, and operational controls that govern the presence or absence of third-party provision become important. • Information management within the context of remote work and side jobs – the revision was linked to changes in the working environment, such as the spread of remote work, fluidity of employ - ment, and the growing prevalence of side jobs and secondary employment, and states points to note in management based on the premise of increased opportunities to come into contact with trade secrets outside of company facilities. Specifically, the importance of terminal and environment man - agement is shown, such as multi-factor authen - tication for remote access, encryption of data
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