USA – MINNESOTA Trends and Developments Contributed by: Barry Landy, Jacob Siegel and Patrick “Gus” Cochran, Ciresi Conlin LLP
disclosed, but also when a plaintiff must identify its alleged trade secrets and how specifically it must do so. The timing and level of detail required for trade secret identification can significantly affect the viability of the claims, the scope of discovery, and the cost of the litigation. Courts in the District of Minnesota have consistently found that even at the preliminary stages of discovery, “[a] plaintiff must describe its trade secrets with the same specificity expected at summary judgment or tri - al”. Mednet Sols., Inc. v Jacobson , 2021 WL 6931589, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 16, 2021); accord Porus Media Corp. v Midland Brake, Inc. , 187 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Ordering the listing of trade secrets at the outset of the litigation is a common requirement.”). Courts routinely require early identification to prevent plaintiffs from using discovery to search for – or rede - fine – their alleged trade secrets as the case unfolds. Minnesota courts have also provided guidance as to what “sufficient particularity” means. In Bepex Int’l LLC v Hoskawa Micron BV , No 19-cv-2997, ECF No 97 at 11 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2022), the court found that a trade secret plaintiff must disclose sufficient informa - tion to allow the defendant to “understand[] the num - ber of trade secrets at issue, the number of each trade secret’s constitutive elements, and the characteris - tics that make the[] trade secrets, trade secrets”. Id. The court stated that this includes, but is not limited to, “separately listing and describing with precision each alleged trade secret individually, detailing each secret’s exact identity, content, boundaries, scope, and constitutive elements—including a thorough dis - section and description of any asserted combina - tion of elements and their relationships to each other within each trade secret—without relying on general, conclusory, generic, or vague phrases”. Id. The risks of failing to meet these requirements are shown by the more recent decision in Plus One, LLC v Capital Relocation Services L.L.C. , No 23-cv-2016, 2025 WL 1692421, at *1 (D. Minn. June 17, 2025). That case involved “a hard-fought trade secret dis - pute between two industry competitors” that featured what the court described as “metastasizing discovery fights—often focused on the disclosure of the trade secrets [plaintiff] allege[d] against [defendant]”. Id.
After the defendant moved to challenge the suffi - ciency of the plaintiff’s disclosures, the court agreed the plaintiff had not identified its trade secrets with sufficient particularity, ordered an amended trade secret disclosure, and stayed all depositions until it had received supplemental briefing on the sufficien - cy of the amended disclosure. ECF 149; 153; 224. Before the court ruled on the parties’ supplemental briefing, however, the plaintiff informed the court via a letter of “its intent to narrow the scope of its asserted trade secrets” to address the defendant’s lingering concerns. ECF 228. Based on this representation, the court denied the defendant’s pending motion as moot. Plus One, 2025 WL 1692421, at *1. As the court later observed, “the peace was short- lived”. Id. at *2. After the plaintiff served its new dis - closure, the defendant filed a new motion, this time to preclude the plaintiff from asserting what it char - acterised as “new” trade secrets. ECF 238 at 5. The defendant asserted that the promised narrowing had not occurred, and that the plaintiff had instead expanded its trade secrets from 16 to 38. Id. at 6-7. The court agreed and elected to “preclude [plaintiff] from asserting newly identified trade secrets that nei - ther narrow nor streamline the previously identified trade secrets” and that were therefore “contrary to the letter and spirit” of the plaintiff’s letter to the court. ECF 262. As a result, more than half of the plaintiff’s claimed trade secrets were excluded from the case, and the court prohibited any further amendments to its trade secret disclosure “without leave of Court” which would be granted only on a showing of “extraordinary good cause”. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff appealed that ruling to the district court, suggesting that the magistrate judge’s preclusion order was dispositive because it struck claimed trade secrets from the case and should be reviewed de novo. Plus One , 2025 WL 1692421, at *1. The district court judge disagreed. Id. at *3. The court held that the magistrate judge’s preclusion order arose from a discovery dispute and did not “dispose of any claim or defense”. Id. The court observed that the preclusion order did “not strip [plaintiff] of any claim” in the case; “at worst”, it could “eventually weaken [plaintiff]’s hand... by limiting further disclosure of new trade
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