White-Collar Crime 2025

UKRAINE Trends and Developments Contributed by: Denys Bugay, Volodymyr Vashchenko, Denys Shkarovsky and Oleksandr Lukianenko, VB Partners

tion will increase, as NABU and SAPO seek to dem - onstrate their effectiveness to the public. Reset of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine Another pre-trial investigation authority specialising in the investigation of certain white-collar crime cases is the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU). It was established as the sole body responsible for com - bating economic crime, designed to combine both law enforcement and analytical functions. However, during its operation ESBU has demonstrat - ed systemic shortcomings, including: • poor results in investigations; • reliance on “force-based” investigative methods rather than analytical ones; and • the absence of new personnel to replace investiga - tors of the abolished tax police. Instead of employing analytical instruments, the Bureau has resorted to coercive measures (such as searches, seizures of property, and confiscation of documents). Particular attention from ESBU detec - tives has been directed towards the gambling indus - try, retail chains, and the tobacco sector. In response, in July 2024 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted a law providing for a reset of ESBU. The core element of the reform is the renewal of competitive procedures for staff recruitment. All employees who refuse to undergo, or who fail, the attestation process are subject to dismissal. The attestation will be conducted in stages – first cover - ing the senior management of the central office and regional departments, and subsequently all other ESBU employees. In the first half of 2025, a competition was held to fill the position of head of ESBU. A selection commis - sion of six members was established to oversee the process. Notably, half of its membership – three repre - sentatives – were delegated by international partners, whose votes proved decisive. This arrangement was introduced to ensure transparency and independence in the selection procedure.

As a result of the competition, the commission select - ed a winner and submitted his candidacy to the cabi - net of ministers of Ukraine for approval. However, contrary to the provisions of the law, the cabinet of ministers did not confirm the winner’s appointment and instead demanded that the com - mission submit alternative candidates for considera - tion. This breach of the law provoked criticism of the government from the public, members of Parliament, anti-corruption activists, and the media. The commission publicly refused to propose alterna - tive candidates to the government, which resulted in a prolonged period of uncertainty regarding the out - come of the competition. Only after sustained criticism, the potential derail - ment of Ukraine’s international commitments, and controversy surrounding the restriction of NABU and SAPO’s procedural independence did the government approve the appointment of the selected candidate as head of ESBU. Upon taking office, the new head of ESBU established the following key priorities for the Bureau’s future activities: • re-attestation of all employees, restructuring of the institution to ensure transparent and fair opera - tions; • combating systemic economic crime, with priority given to complex schemes rather than minor busi - ness infringements; • replacing “force-based” methods of law enforce - ment with analytical approaches, with the primary objective being the prevention of offences rather than their subsequent investigation; • protecting legitimate businesses in order to improve the investment climate; and • establishing co-operation with law enforcement authorities of other countries to identify and address cross-border criminal activity. Reform of ARMA The National Agency of Ukraine for the Detection, Tracing and Management of Assets Derived from Corruption and Other Crimes (commonly referred to

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