FRANCE Law and Practice Contributed by: Christophe Ingrain, Tristan Gautier and Benoît Martinez, Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier
2.6 Prosecution White-collar prosecutions in France may be triggered by the prosecutor or victims. France follows the principle of prosecutorial discre - tion: public prosecutors are not obliged to prosecute every case where an offence is suspected; instead, they may decide whether to prosecute, divert the case, or dismiss it. The Ministry of Justice periodically issues general instructions of criminal policy that shape how pros - ecutors prioritise certain offences, including financial and corporate crime. Within this framework, prosecu - tors enjoy autonomy in assessing whether prosecu - tion is appropriate. Victims retain rights to initiate or compel prosecution by filing complaints directly before the investigating judge (under certain conditions), effectively bypass - ing prosecutorial discretion if the prosecutor declines to act. Additionally, regulatory authorities such as the AMF, the AFA, and the PNF play active roles in report - ing to prosecutors. Recent enforcement trends show the PNF proactively pursuing deferred prosecution agreements (CJIPs), negotiating settlements conditional upon corporate co-operation and remediation efforts. This evolution reflects a more transactional approach to prosecution. 2.7 Deferred Prosecution French law provides for a specific mechanism allow - ing the resolution of certain corporate criminal investi - gations without prosecution: the CJIP (Article 41-1-2, CPP). This deferred prosecution agreement is avail - able exclusively to legal entities (not individuals) pros - ecuted for certain offences, including corruption, influ -
• pay a public interest fine of up to 30% of the aver - age annual turnover of the group of companies over the last three years; • implement or strengthen a compliance programme, under the supervision of the AFA, for a maximum period of three years; and/or • compensate victims for damages caused. CJIPs are often contingent on the company’s proac - tive co-operation, including self-reporting, compre - hensive internal investigations, and implementation of corrective measures to reduce fines. Judicial Approval and Effects The proposed CJIP must be validated by a judge in a public hearing (Article 41-1-2, II, CPP). Once approved and executed, the agreement extinguishes the public prosecution of the legal entity. The legal representa - tives of the legal entity involved remain personally liable. Unlike a criminal conviction, the CJIP does not entail an admission of guilt but requires the company’s acknowledgement of the facts. No conviction is entered on the company’s criminal record, though the agreement is published on the AFA’s website to ensure transparency. If the company refuses the CJIP or fails to comply with its obligations, the prosecutor may resume prosecu - tion (Article 41-1-2, III, CPP). 3. White-Collar Offences 3.1 Criminal Company Law and Corporate Fraud Under Article 121-2, CP, legal entities can be held criminally liable for offences committed on their behalf by their organs, representatives, or agents. Key offences in corporate criminal law are misappro - priation of assets and embezzlement (Articles 314-1 to 314-3, CP), abuse of corporate assets (Articles L. 241-3 and L. 242-6 of the Commercial Code (C.Com. – Code de commerce ), fraud (Articles 313-1 to 313- 3, CP), forgery and use of forged documents (Arti - cles 441-1 to 441-12, CP), falsification of corporate
ence peddling or tax fraud. Conditions for Agreement
As long as public prosecution has not been initiated, the public prosecutor may propose that the legal enti - ty involved conclude a CJIP imposing one or more of the following conditions:
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