NORWAY Law and Practice Contributed by: Hedvig Moe, Pål Lieungh, Espen Randen and Elin Ibsen Gustavsen, Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS
concentrated base of players with significant state ownership, resulting in limited JV experience. The regulatory framework for technology transfer and IP ownership is shaped primarily by defence procure - ment rules, export control, and bespoke contractual arrangements. Under RAF, the public defence sector acquires non- exclusive user rights to IP generated under defence contracts rather than outright ownership, with certain exemptions. Where the state has funded R&D, it is typically entitled to a royalty. These retained govern - ment rights must be accommodated in JV structures. In JV contracts, partners typically retain ownership of contributed (background) technology, with licensing arrangements enabling JV use. IP developed within the JV (foreground IP) generally vests in the JV entity, subject to license-back arrangements. Technology sharing within a JV is subject to export control. The Security Act’s requirements for facility security clearance and handling classified informa - tion further constrain how technology may be shared within a JV group with foreign partners. 6.9 Interaction with Competition/Antitrust Review There are no formal co-ordination mechanisms between FDI assessments and merger control. These are assessed separately, with no joint processes. As noted in 6.1 FDI Screening Legislation and Regula- tory Framework , the government’s “golden power” may be exercised regardless of whether the activity is otherwise permitted by law, thus overriding competi - tion law outcomes. 7. Investigations and Litigation in the Defence Sector 7.1 Principal Investigative Authorities General investigative and prosecutorial powers lie with the police. Espionage, sabotage and acts of terrorism are the responsibility of PST. PST is also responsible for sanctions and export control breach - es. For procurement disputes, courts exercise judicial review under LOA and FOSA, with powers to set aside
pre-contractual decisions, while KOFA acts as the complaints board and can issue advisory decisions on compliance with the procurement rules. 7.2 Triggers for Investigation There are no particular triggers for publicly known regulatory investigations in the defence sector. As a starting point, there are no mandatory self-reporting obligations, but there are obligations on entities that are made subject to the Security Act on certain secu - rity threatening activities. 7.3 Investigative Powers and Procedures The police and the PST have regular law enforcement powers, including search and seizure and the freezing of assets. 7.4 Dawn Raids and Unannounced Inspections The police and the PST have regular law enforce - ment powers, including dawn raids. As a main rule, on-site inspections under the Security Act must be notified in writing in advance. However, NSM and sec - toral supervisory authorities may conduct inspections without notice where security considerations make it necessary. 7.5 Legal Professional Privilege and Confidentiality Legal professional privilege applies without a national security carve-out. The privilege rests on evidentiary prohibitions in the Criminal Procedure Act, which pre - vents courts from receiving testimony from lawyers about matters confided to them in their professional capacity, unless the client consents. The correspond - ing civil law provision is in the Dispute Act. The Advo - cates Act establishes a comprehensive statutory duty of confidentiality for all information an advocate receives in connection with an engagement, and pro - vides that the core privilege may be overridden only where expressly provided or clearly presupposed by statute. Neither the Security Act nor the Export Con - trol Act contains an express override of the lawyer- client privilege.
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