SINGAPORE Law and Practice Contributed by: Randolph Khoo, See Chern Yang, Tan Ei Leen and Sharon Ki, Drew & Napier
defines an “arbitral award” very broadly to include “an order or a direction made or given by an arbitral tri - bunal in the course of an arbitration”. This approach facilitates the enforceability of an award as to interim measures. Policy considerations to develop Singapore as a hub for international arbitration have also given impetus to legislative amendments to include emer - gency arbitrators within the definition of an “arbitral tri - bunal” under Section 2 (1) of the IAA. This amendment makes clear that awards by emergency arbitrators are enforceable in Singapore courts in the same way as a final award of an arbitral tribunal. This interpretation of Section 2 (1) of the IAA was confirmed in CVG v CVH (2023), 3 SLR 1559 at (36) and (37), which affirmed that an interim award issued by an emergency arbitra - tor in an arbitration seated outside of Singapore was, in principle, enforceable in Singapore. The court held that such an interim award would meet the definition of a “foreign award” under the IAA and would corre - spondingly be enforceable under the IAA. Finality of the Award Section 19B of the IAA provides that an award is final and binding when it is made by the arbitral tribunal, signed and delivered to the parties. The widely held view is that an award remains binding notwithstand - ing the right of appeal. A party challenging enforce - ment must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the award has not yet become binding on the parties or that the award has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made. While the highest court in Singapore in Astro took the view that an award that has been set aside would generally lead to the conclusion that “there is simply no award to enforce”, any foreign court decision in Singapore would ultimately only have legal value if it were rec - ognised under Singapore’s private international law rules. In PT Perusahaan Gas Negara ( Persero ) TBK v CRW Joint Operation (2015), 4 SLR 364 at (105), it was held that an interim award enforcing a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) decision under the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction 1999 is “final and binding” within the meaning of Section 19B of the IAA. This decision of the highest court in Singapore effectively removes any ambiguity as to the enforceability of such
interim awards under Singapore’s international arbi - tration legislation, and was welcomed not only in inter - national arbitration circles but also in the construction industry, as it gave effect to the “argue now, pay later” principle that is crucial to the success of DABs under the FIDIC suite of contracts in ensuring security of payment in large international projects. Limitation Period for the Enforcement and Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards A party seeking to enforce an arbitral award in Sin - gapore must do so within six years from the date the award was issued (Section 6 (1)(c) of the Limitation Act 1959). An application to set aside an award made under the AA and IAA must be made within three months of the date the applicant receives the award (Section 48 (2) of the AA and Article 34 (3) of the UNCI - TRAL Model Law). Appealing an Order for the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award Any appeal against a decision of the General Divi - sion of the High Court in the exercise of its original or appellate civil jurisdiction that arises from a case relating to the law of arbitration is made to the court of appeal (Sixth Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969). Judicial Attitude Towards Challenges to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards In order to give effect to the New York Convention, which seeks to promote arbitration and eschews curial intervention, the grounds for resisting enforcement are generally construed narrowly. In CKG v CKH (2021), 5 SLR 84 at (7), the Singapore International Commercial Court held that the courts must be satisfied that the challenge against an award falls squarely within the grounds for resisting the enforcement and that – in its assessment of the award – the court will not be overly technical in its interpretation thereof. For instance, to succeed in a challenge to enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds of public policy, the award must “offend against our basic notions of justice and morality” or there must be “exceptional cir - cumstances to justify a refusal of enforcement” ( Gals- worthy Ltd of the Republic of Liberia v Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd (2011), 1 SLR 727 at (17), cited in CDI
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