CHILE Law and Practice Contributed by: Christian Alvarado and Agustín Alcalde, Clyde & Co Chile
of lawfulness, purpose limitation, proportionality and security, strengthening employees’ rights over their data and requiring employers to update their internal data processing policies. 7.3 Access The parties may exercise the right of access only in respect of their own personal data collected in the context of an internal investigation, in accordance with data protection regulations. There is no right to access third parties’ personal data or the entirety of the investigation file, and the employer may lawfully restrict such access in order to safeguard confiden - tiality, protect sensitive data of other individuals, and preserve the integrity of the investigation, particularly in cases of workplace harassment, sexual harassment or violence at work. 7.4 AI In practice, the use of artificial intelligence is neither common nor advisable in labour internal investiga - tions. Where it is used, it should be limited to sup - port functions (for example, organising information or conducting preliminary document analysis), without replacing human assessment. Its use entails signifi - cant data protection risks and must therefore strictly comply with confidentiality obligations, purpose limi - tation, proportionality, and the prohibition of automat - ed decision-making. In Chile, there is currently no general, comprehen - sive whistle-blower protection regime that applies cross-cuttingly to the private sector. The legal frame - work provides partial, fragmented and sector-spe - cific mechanisms, with varying levels of protection depending on the context in which the report is made, which prevents the existence of an autonomous and robust labour-law whistle-blowing statute comparable to those in other jurisdictions. Public Sector In the public sector, Law No 21,592 expressly regu - lates whistle-blowing channels before the Office of the Comptroller General ( Contraloría General de la 8. Special Cases 8.1 Whistle-Blowing
República ), in relation to conduct affecting the pub - lic interest. This regime establishes a formal whistle- blowing system that includes institutional reporting channels, identity protection, preventive protective measures, anti-retaliation rules, and a reinforced protection framework applicable to civil servants, employees, contractors, trainees and other persons linked to public administration. This system expressly acknowledges the risk of retaliation and establishes specific mechanisms to prevent and sanction it. Private Sector By contrast, in the private sector, whistle-blowing has developed mainly from a criminal and compliance perspective, particularly under the Corporate Crimi - nal Liability regime and its expansion following the enactment of the Economic Crimes Act. In this con - text, internal reporting channels form part of crime- prevention models, allowing the reporting of conduct of public interest – primarily criminal or economic in nature – and enabling internal investigations within a framework often described as corporate justice. However, these mechanisms do not provide a labour- law-based whistle-blower protection statute, nor do they establish specific rights, procedural guarantees or clear safeguards against retaliation. Their primary function is to protect the company, rather than the reporting worker. Protection of Whistle-Blowers From a labour-law perspective, Chilean law does not recognise whistle-blowing as a distinct legal proce - dure, nor does it provide a specific category of “public- interest reporting” within employment law. The labour system is structured around private interest disputes between employer and employee, rather than the protection of the public interest, creating a structural mismatch with whistle-blowing models developed in other legal systems. In practice, employees who report wrongdoing of public interest within the com - pany face significant exposure to retaliation and must seek protection ex post through general mechanisms, primarily fundamental rights protection claims. This protection is limited and fragmented, as funda - mental rights claims were not designed specifically for whistle-blowing, require high evidentiary thresh - olds, and shift the focus from the public interest to
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