SWITZERLAND Trends and Developments Contributed by: Jean-Marc Carnicé, Canonica Valticos Carnicé & Associés
The Egmont Group also admits governmental or inter - governmental organisations as non‑member observ - ers whose roles relate to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Such observers include, among others, the European Commission, Europol, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Egmont Group defines itself as a facilitator of information exchange between FIUs, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in order to support the global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. It also aims to enhance co-operation between FIUs so as to strengthen their individual capabilities and over - all effectiveness. To achieve these objectives, the Egmont Group pro - vides FIUs with a secure platform for sharing expertise and financial intelligence. However, it does not con - duct financial investigations itself, as these are car - ried out by national law enforcement and investigative authorities. As an example of its activities, the Egmont Group reg - ularly publishes anonymised financial analysis cases, which facilitate the sharing of knowledge among FIUs and raise awareness among key stakeholders. Functioning Under the Egmont Group Charter, members are required to promote the widest possible co-operation and exchange of information with other FIUs, based on reciprocity or mutual agreement and in accordance with fundamental principles. These principles include the free exchange of information for analytical pur - poses at FIU level, the prohibition on disclosure or use of information for other purposes without prior consent, and the obligation to protect confidentiality. Members are also encouraged to actively support the work of the Egmont Group, including participation in projects, subject to their resources and competencies. In line with these principles, FIUs must have a suf - ficient legal basis to co-operate on matters relating to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and must be capable of provid -
ing international co-operation in a rapid and effective manner. Tensions and challenges relating to international mutual legal assistance in Switzerland and the Egmont Group FIUs are encouraged to engage in spontaneous dis - closures of information to their foreign counterparts. They may exchange information to which they have direct or indirect access, or which they are authorised to obtain at national level, subject to the principle of reciprocity. At national level, however, requests from foreign coun - terparts must comply with Article 31 of the Anti‑Mon - ey Laundering Act (AMLA). Consequently, the Money Laundering Reporting Office cannot act on requests that have no clear connection with Switzerland. This provision ensures that it does not engage in fishing expeditions. Overriding procedural guarantees Article 30, AMLA authorises law enforcement authori - ties to transmit confidential information gathered through reports made by financial intermediaries to foreign authorities. Such intermediaries are able to observe and report facts in real time which judicial authorities would struggle to obtain, as the legal requirements for coercive measures are often not yet met. Legal considerations Fishing expeditions Provided that the requesting authority undertakes to use the information exclusively for analytical purposes in the fight against money laundering, reciprocity is ensured and the exceptions in Article 31, AMLA do not apply, the procedure of international mutual legal The exchange of information between the Money Laundering Reporting Office and its foreign coun - terparts is of critical importance, as most predicate offences underlying reported cases are committed abroad. Obtaining information from counterpart FIUs is therefore essential for assembling a case file that can be referred to prosecutorial authorities. assistance is displaced. Admissibility of evidence
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