Sanctions 2025

FRANCE Trends and Developments Contributed by: William Julié, Amélie Beauchemin, Camille Gosson and Elena Moreno, WJ Avocats

Russian targets, the EU is now actively sanctioning foreign actors whose conduct, although external to the initial scope of the sanctions regime, is considered instrumental in undermining it. While the EU has not explicitly adopted a framework of secondary sanc - tions, its actions increasingly resemble such a model. Entities located far outside EU jurisdiction are now sanctioned based on their alleged interactions with sanctioned Russian actors, even absent a direct EU nexus. This evolution challenges foundational princi - ples of sovereignty, legal predictability and propor - tionality. Sectoral sanctions and non-EU actors: Regulation 833/2014 Complementing the asset freeze regime under Reg - ulation 269/2014 is Regulation 833/2014, which addresses sectoral measures. Recent amendments – particularly through the 14th and 16th sanctions packages – further reflect the EU’s intent to project its regulatory power beyond its borders. Article 5a, introduced in the 14th package and amend - ed in the 16th, enables the listing of financial institu - tions and crypto-asset service providers that support Russia’s defence-industrial complex, participate in cir - cumvention or facilitate prohibited transactions. Nota - bly, the article applies regardless of whether the entity is based in the EU or is even simply connected to it. Additionally, Article 3s targets vessels flagged by or operated from third countries. These vessels, alleg - edly involved in transporting military-relevant goods, face service bans including access to EU ports and maritime services. The 15th and 16th sanctions pack - ages designated 52 and 74 vessels, respectively. The 16th package also introduced Article 3d(1b), pro - hibiting access to EU airspace and airports for non- Russian airlines providing domestic services within Russia or supplying banned aviation equipment. Alongside these measures, Article 5ac imposed trans - action bans on three foreign banks using Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) – a domestic alternative to Society for Worldwide Inter - bank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).

These provisions underscore the EU’s evolving enforcement philosophy, which places increasing weight on the perceived role of third-country actors in enabling circumvention. However, the legal and diplomatic implications of sanctioning entities outside the EU with no direct connection to Russia or the EU remain contentious. The Expanding Personal Nexus: Targeting Relatives and Associates The rise of associative listings In parallel with its geographic expansion, the EU has embraced a more flexible and arguably controversial interpretation of personal connection as a basis for sanctions. Traditionally, sanctions were directed at individuals based on their actions or direct involve - ment in prohibited activities. Recent EU measures, however, increasingly focus on family members or associates of designated persons, premised on a broad understanding of “benefit”. On 5 June 2023, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089, the Coun - cil amended Article 2 (1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 to allow the listing of individuals who are immediate fam - ily members of leading Russian business persons and are deemed to benefit from them (hereafter “amended criterion (g)”). The rationale for the creation of said criterion is clear: “the Council has also assessed that leading Russian businesspersons have engaged in a systematic prac - tice of distributing their funds and assets amongst their immediate family members and other persons, often in order to hide their assets, to circumvent the restrictive measures and to maintain control over the resources available to them. Therefore, the Council considers that immediate family members or other natural persons, who benefit in such a way from leading businesspersons operating in Russia, should also be designated as appropriate, in order to both increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine as well as to avoid the risk of cir - cumvention of the restrictive measures” (Recital 5 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023).

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