NETHERLANDS Trends and Developments Contributed by: Sebastiaan Bennink, Sally Eshun, Siqi Zhao and Daniel Webb, Bennink Dunin-Wasowicz
has previously announced that it would make the enforcement of EU sanctions a priority. In multiple pro - ceedings, it requested that prison sentences should be imposed while also requesting the dissolution of a company in another case. In its annual report of 2024, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service ( Fiscale inlichtingen- en opsporingsdienst ) indicated that it has increased the time spent on sanctions enforcement, focusing on the port of Rotterdam con - sidering its role as “a logistics hub in Europe”. Sanctions enforcement in the Netherlands has been very proactive compared to other EU member states. In France, there have been no criminal convictions to speak of so far, and investigations have been limited in number. Similarly, in Belgium only a small number of enforcement actions have been initiated. The fact that the Dutch legislator did not require amendments to its Sanctions Act following the Directive speaks to the fact that sanctions enforcement was always regarded as a serious offence. Enforcement unsurpris - ingly picked up after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the Dutch authorities acknowledge their position as a popular country for economic actors.
While the Dutch authorities go after sanctions viola - tions in a rigorous manner, which is reflected in steep fines and the imposition of prison sentences, they also acknowledge the fact that, with the number of transactions occurring regularly and the multitude of stakeholders involved, it is not possible to detect and investigate every sanctions violation, irrespective of the severity of the offences. The Guidelines on self- reporting were therefore adopted to tackle this issue in a practical manner. Accepting that some cases might otherwise not come to light, the Guidelines aim to offer instructions for companies to come forward and co- operate during the investigation. However, it is impor - tant to recognise the shortcomings of the Guidelines in their current form. While their stated objective is to provide legal entities with incentives on self-reporting, co-operation and self-investigation – thereby enhanc - ing the information position of the Public Prosecution Service and, more broadly, contributing to the efficien - cy of investigations and prosecutions – the Guidelines remain ambiguous, uncertain and potentially costly for legal entities. Whether – and to what extent – the Guidelines on self-reporting, co-operation and self- investigation will provide practical guidance to legal entities and incentivise them to self-report and co- operate remains to be seen in practice. Note: The authors express their gratitude to Alfredo Garcia Sanchez for his research and assistance in drafting this article.
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