SWITZERLAND Trends and Developments Contributed by: Philippe Reich, Meera Rolaz, Kaspar Projer, Samantha Salsench and Anna Zellweger, Baker McKenzie Switzerland AG
Swiss Policy Considerations For many years, Switzerland was not considered rel - evant from a global sanctions compliance perspec - tive, ignoring the fact that (i) around 80% of Swiss companies export worldwide, and (ii) Switzerland is the regional if not global trading hub for many multi - nationals, thus automatically triggering applicability of Swiss sanctions. This perception somewhat changed for the first time in 2011 with the adoption of stringent sanctions against Iran and of course in 2022 after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine when the Swiss govern - ment ultimately decided to implement EU sanctions, doing away with mere “anti-circumvention” measures adopted in 2014. Switzerland cannot adopt sanctions unilaterally. How - ever, as a UN member, it is obligated to implement the UN Security Council’s non-military coercive measures. Moreover, Switzerland now also regularly implements other broadly supported international sanctions, in particular those imposed by the EU, albeit not being an EU (or even EEA) member state. Switzerland adopts such sanctions autonomously in its foreign (economic) policy interest with a certain degree of political discretion. Discussions in Switzerland and abroad often turn on whether and to what extent Switzerland should align with EU or even other western sanctions, mistaking the concept of Swiss neutrality. According to the law of neutrality, Switzerland must not participate in a war between states. This is also reflected in the sanc - tions against Russia, whereby the sale or supply of war material or dual-use items for military purposes to Ukraine is also prohibited. However, the neutrality policy does not preclude Switzerland from aligning with international sanctions condemning actions in (flagrant) violation of international law. With Switzer - land being the host nation of the UN, the ICRC and many other (humanitarian) international organisations, the Swiss government upholds the principles of inter - national law, including the enforcement of interna - tional sanctions. Consequently, the competent Swiss authority (SECO) is attempting to enforce sanctions, including their circumvention, more strictly.
Swiss Enforcement Landscape Under Swiss sanctions jurisdiction, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) is responsible for the enforcement of the Federal Act on the Imple - mentation of International Sanctions (the “Embargo Act”), and thus of the sanctions ordinances enacted thereunder (eg, Article 32 of the Ukraine Ordinance). SECO neither publishes initiated nor ongoing or concluded enforcement proceedings. SECO does not publish penalty orders, either. There are – still – also only very limited court rulings available covering (potential) violations of Swiss sanctions. The few details available on the Swiss sanctions enforcement map originate from details provided by SECO in the context of parliamentary inquiries and on the occasion of public presentations. Moreover, a series of final administrative criminal decisions ren - dered by SECO were obtained through a Freedom of Information request lodged with SECO. All decisions, of which 15 were published, were rendered following violations of the Ukraine Ordinance and the Belarus Ordinance. Moreover, the Report of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland of April 2025 on its activities in 2024 mentions two cases that it took over at SECO’s request and which are related to the Swiss sanctions against Russia. Namely, the following pattern becomes apparent. First and foremost, in all decisions published, SECO held a legal person liable, although Swiss sanctions target the individual responsible for the violation. The Embargo Act imposes an original and individual crimi - nal liability. Moreover, due to the sole applicability of administrative criminal law (cf. Article 12 paragraph 1 and Article 14 paragraph 1 EmbA), there is no origi - nal (or even subsidiary) criminal liability of companies (outside of Article 102 paragraph 1 of the Swiss Crimi - nal Code), with the following exception: According to Article 7 paragraph 1 of the Federal Act on Adminis - trative Criminal Law (ACLA), a legal entity (instead of the individual responsible for the sanctions violation) may be fined up to CHF5,000 in case (i) an offence is committed by an enterprise; (ii) the fine in question does not exceed CHF5,000; and (iii) the investigation of the responsible person would require dispropor -
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