DENMARK Trends and Developments Contributed by: Anders Amstrup Fournais and Sarah Bisgaard Møller, Hafnia Law Firm LLP
Denmark is a coastal state. In fact, Denmark is a nation of many islands. Being a member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Denmark has certain obligations regarding ships flying the flag of other convention states. This includes the right of innocent passage, which is a cornerstone in public international law and the law of the seas. The right of ships to enjoy immunity from confiscation and be granted safe passage when sailing through the waters of a coastal state is not an unlimited right. In 2024 and 2025, the most highly debated issue in Denmark within the area of sanctions compliance has been how Denmark and the EU shall control and mitigate the risks posed by the growing number of shadow fleet vessels that are being utilised by Russia to carry crude oil and refined oil products from Russia to states such as India and China. There are several risks inherent to the operation of the shadow fleet of tankers when in Danish waters. It is a clear trend in recent sanctions packages (especially the 15th, 16th and 17th packages adopted by the EU in December 2024, February 2025 and May 2025, respectively) that tanker vessels are increasingly being listed. Listings are done pursuant to Article 3s of EU Council Regulation 833/2014. The listing criteria were crafted in light of concerns expressed by the Inter - national Maritime Organization (IMO) in Resolution A.1192 (33), which states the following in paragraph 1: “...for the purpose of this resolution, ‘dark fleet’ or ‘shadow fleet’ mean ships that are engaged in illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanc - tions, evading compliance with safety or environmen - tal regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities, which may include: • carrying out unsafe operations which do not adhere to international regulations and well- established and strict industry standards and best practices; • intentionally avoiding flag State and port State control inspections; • not maintaining adequate liability insurance or other financial security; • intentionally avoiding commercial screenings or inspections;
• not operating under a transparent corporate gov - ernance policy that assures the welfare and safety of those on board and the protection of the marine environment; or • intentionally taking measures to avoid ship detec - tion such as switching off their AIS or LRIT trans - missions or concealing the ship’s actual identity when there is no legitimate safety or security concern sufficient to justify such action...” Ships that are used deliberately to breach and circum - vent sanctions are not permitted to conduct any busi - ness having nexus with the EU and are thus eligible for listing. This also applies to businesses within the EU that materially aid said tankers’ illegal operations. Interestingly, the listing criteria are much broader, and include not only ships that are operated in breach of sanctions but also ships that pose a threat to the environment of EU coastal states. The authors have therefore seen ships be sanctioned not because they are seen to carry Russian oil in breach of the price cap, but because they are engaged in other illegal operations such as not maintaining adequate liability insurance or evading compliance with environmental regulations. Once a ship is sanctioned, it cannot interact in any way with Danish and European service providers, except pilots granting safe pilotage through narrow straits – eg, Oresund which is a strait between Den - mark and Sweden that many tankers transit through when travelling from Russia to third countries. Nonetheless, even sanctioned ships enjoy innocent passage and continue to steam through Danish and European waters en route to a consignee in, for exam - ple, China or India. One might consider that the fact that the ship cannot be bunkered, or receive fresh water or other services such as a crew change, when travelling from Russia to Suez is a tremendous “stress factor” for the crew and her operations department, pushing the tolerable limits and thus amplifying the risk of a serious casualty that could result in a catastrophic oil spill.
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