DENMARK Law and Practice Contributed by: Simon Evers Hjelmborg, Christian Monberg, Linn Dyrgaard Stinus and Ann Sophie Juul Hird, Accura Advokatpartnerselskab
• The perpetrator acted in excusable ignorance of or excusable misunderstanding of legal rules that prohibit or mandate the action. • The perpetrator has voluntarily averted or attempted to avert the danger caused by the criminal act. • The perpetrator has confessed. • The perpetrator has provided information crucial for solving criminal acts committed by others. • The perpetrator has repaired or attempted to repair the damage caused by the criminal act • The act was committed as a result of coer - cion, fraud, or exploitation of the perpetrator’s young age or significant economic or person - al difficulties, lack of insight, recklessness, or an existing dependency relationship • Enough time has passed since the criminal act was committed that applying the usual sanction is unnecessary. Under Danish law, individuals and/or compa - nies are not per se obligated to report violations of anti-bribery. It is not in itself criminalised to not report on corruption or bribery violations. To be an accomplice to the crime, one must have intent to carry out the crime. This means there is no risk of being an accomplice by failing to report a violation. However, all Danish companies with more than 50 employees are required to establish an inter - nal whistle-blower programme as stipulated in Section 9 of The Danish Law of Protection of Whistleblowers (Act No 1436 of 29 June 2021, whistleblowerloven ) (the “Whistleblower Act”). Whistle-blower programmes can urge the dis - closure of suspicion or knowledge of a commit - 6. Disclosure Processes 6.1 Disclosure Obligations
ted violation since they provide for protection and anonymity. See 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle-Blowers . Moreover, the Danish Public Procurement Act (Consolidated Act No 10 of 6 January 2023, udbudsloven ) (the “Public Procurement Act”) entail obligations on disclosure (and to some extent disqualification) for entities participating in public tender procedures. 6.2 Voluntary Disclosure Incentives There are no direct incentive programmes to encourage self-disclosure of potential violations in relation to anti-bribery and anti-corruption. Self-reporting can however affect the sentencing positively as further detailed under 5.2 Guide- lines Applicable to the Assessment of Penal- ties . It is possible for individuals as well as compa - nies to anonymously report violations of bribery and/or corruption through the Danish Business Authority’s ( Erhvervsstyrelsens ) whistle-blower programme, but no benefits are given to the ones who do. 6.3 Self-Disclosure Procedures Self-disclosure procedures are not relevant in Denmark, as detailed in 6.2 Voluntary Disclo- sure Incentives . 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle- Blowers Section 5-8 of the Whistleblower Act outlines the protection of whistle-blowers and the require - ments an individual must meet to be categorised as a whistle-blower protected under the law. The law protects whistle-blowers reporting to an internal whistle-blower programme, external
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