ENGLAND & WALES Law and Practice Contributed by: Steven Kay KC, Richard Paton-Philip, Kabir Sondhi and Lucy Kinder, 9BR Chambers
6. Disclosure Processes 6.1 Disclosure Obligations
6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle- Blowers Workers in public, private or voluntary sectors who act as statutory whistle-blowers under the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998 are protected from unfair dismissal or detrimental treatment so long as the matter upon which they inform is in the public interest. The protec - tions under PIDA 1998 do not apply to the self- employed, volunteers, armed forces, or intel - ligence services. The PIDA 1998 protections continue after the whistle-blower has ceased their work. Detrimental treatment is a widely drawn phrase that covers negative treatment, bullying or harassment. Other whistle-blowers are informants who must negotiate their protec - tions and benefits from their disclosures as they interact with the law enforcement or regulatory agencies. 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle- Blowers There are currently no provisions in place in England & Wales for whistle-blowers to receive financial incentives for reporting bribery and corruption. This is in contrast to the US, where whistle-blowers may receive a percentage of money recovered from a corporate on convic - tion or after a plea deal. A similar system has been mooted for England & Wales, but nothing more concrete has materialised. The new Direc - tor of the SFO has publicly announced support for a whistle-blower programme and indicated that he intends to use it as a strategy in future investigations.
There is no positive duty for individuals or com - panies to disclose bribery and corruption viola - tions. 6.2 Voluntary Disclosure Incentives As highlighted previously, corporates accused of offences under the Bribery Act have significant incentives to self-report, including the ability to persuade prosecuting authorities either not to prosecute or to enter into Deferred Prosecution Agreement negotiations, and the reduction of penalties on conviction. Deferred Prosecution Agreements are not avail - able for individuals. There are incentives for individuals to self-report in the form of reduc - tion of penalties on conviction. Individuals may also seek to avail themselves of the “assisting offender” provisions under Sections 71 and 72 of the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (immunity from prosecution and restricted use undertakings) and Sections 74 and 388 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (reduction and review of sentence). 6.3 Self-Disclosure Procedures Individuals and corporates who wish to self- report can approach the relevant prosecuting or regulatory authority, such as the FCA, directly or through a proxy, who is usually a lawyer, to provide information upon wrongdoing. Individu - als may be considered to be statutory whistle- blowers in such a procedure if they expose wrongdoing at their workplace that it is in the “public interest” to know (see 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle-Blowers and 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle-Blowers for more informa- tion concerning whistle-blowers).
7. Enforcement Trends 7.1 Enforcement
Enforcement of anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws are primarily a criminal matter in England &
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