HONG KONG Law and Practice Contributed by: Gareth Hughes, Emily Lam, Philip Rohlik and Tiffany Wu, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle- Blowers In Hong Kong, there is no legislation that specifi - cally protects whistle-blowers. However, Section 30A of POBO prevents any witness in civil and criminal proceedings from being compelled to disclose, or to answer any question that may lead to the discovery of, an informer’s name or address and also requires the redaction of any document in such proceedings that may lead to disclosure of the informer’s identity. In addi - tion, ICAC informers whose personal safety or well-being might be at risk may receive witness protection under the Witness Protection Ordi - nance (Cap 564). 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle- Blowers There is no statutory framework for rewarding whistle-blowers. However, self-reporting and co- operation with the authorities are mitigating fac - tors that could result in a more lenient sentence after conviction. Although not guaranteed, this could also influence the prosecutor’s decision on whether to grant immunity from prosecution. For details, see 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme . Bribery offences under POBO are prosecuted criminally, resulting, upon conviction, in the pen - alties outlined in 5.1 Penalties on Conviction . 7.2 Enforcement Bodies The ICAC is the law enforcement agency respon - sible for preventing and investigating corruption in Hong Kong. Under the Independent Commis - sion Against Corruption Ordinance (Cap 204) (ICACO) and POBO, the ICAC has wide-ranging 7. Enforcement Trends 7.1 Enforcement
or is intended to be used in connection with, an indictable offence is required to report that knowledge or suspicion as soon as reasonably practicable to a police officer or the Customs and Excise Department. In practice, suspicious transaction reports (STRs) are made to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), which is jointly run by the Hong Kong Police Force and the Cus - toms and Excise Department. The timely making of an STR triggers a defence to money launder - ing. A person who makes an STR before dealing in the property in question with the consent of the JFIU, or who makes an STR voluntarily as soon as reasonable after dealing in the prop - erty, shall not be liable for the offence of deal - ing in criminal proceeds under Section 25 of the OSCO. 6.2 Voluntary Disclosure Incentives Self-disclosure of potential violations of anti- bribery and anti-corruption provisions are sig - nificant mitigating factors that could lead to a decision not to prosecute, or provide a basis for seeking a reduced sentence in mitigation if the person is prosecuted and convicted, as stated in 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme . 6.3 Self-Disclosure Procedures As stated in 6.1 Disclosure Obligations , there is no general legal duty to disclose or report known or suspected corruption or bribery to law enforcement bodies in Hong Kong, save that financial institutions and their directors, staff and auditors may be required under particular local legislation or regulations to disclose cor - rupt activities to the relevant regulators. Where an obligation to file an STR arises under Section 25A of OSCO, it should be submitted in writing to the JFIU.
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