NORWAY Law and Practice Contributed by: Elisabeth Roscher, Geir Sviggum, Tine Vigmostad and Kristin Nordland Brattli, Wikborg Rein Advokatfirma AS
Trading in Influence Trading in influence is criminalised by Section 389 of the Penal Code (see 2.2 Influence-Ped - dling ). Culpability The Anti-corruption Provisions apply to inten - tional violations (Sections 21 and 22 of the Penal Code). The intent requirement will be met in situations where a person commits a cor - rupt act with the awareness that the act, with certainty, or most likely, fits the description of the offence or considers it possible that the act fits the description of the offence, and chooses to act even if that should be the case. Further - more, the provisions apply to any person who contributes to (aids and abets) the offence (Sec - tion 15). Attempts to violate the Anti-corruption Provisions may also be punishable (Section 17). Violations of the Anti-corruption Provisions may give grounds for corporate criminal liability, provided that the violation/contribution to the violation was committed by persons “acting on behalf” of the company (see 3.3 Corporate Liability ). 2.2 Influence-Peddling Section 389 of the Penal Code criminalises “trading in influence”. As noted in 2.1 Bribery , this offence covers active and passive trading in influence, in the public and private sector, com - mitted in Norway or abroad. According to Section 389, first paragraph, let - ters a and b, trading in influence occurs when a person: • for themselves or others “demands, receives or accepts an offer” of an “improper advan - tage” in “return for influencing the conduct of”
a third party’s “position, office or performance of an assignment”; or • gives or offers any person an “improper advantage” in “return for influencing the conduct of” a third party’s “position, office or performance of an assignment”. Typically, trading in influence occurs when an influencing agent secretly requests, receives or accepts an offer of an advantage in return for exerting influence on a third person’s (ie, the decision-maker’s) professional conduct, who is not aware of the scheme and does not obtain any benefits from it. Both the influencing agent and the person offering or giving the advantage would be exposed to liability. However, Section 389 does not require that the influencing agent actually has the capacity/powers to influence the decision-maker. Furthermore, Section 389 does not require that any advantage has been attained. When assessing whether the advantage is “improper” within the meaning of Section 389, it is considered to be of particular importance whether the influencing agent – for example, a lobbyist – openly informs the decision-maker that they are acting on behalf of another person. If the influencing agent is not transparent about representing another person, such conduct may be regarded as improper. If so, the act would be punishable under Section 389 provided that the other conditions for criminal liability are met. 2.3 Financial Record-Keeping The Accounting Act (1998) and the Bookkeeping Act (2004) require companies to keep adequate books and records. According to the Penal Code, Sections 392–394, violations of provisions regarding bookkeeping and the documentation of accounting informa -
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