NORWAY Law and Practice Contributed by: Elisabeth Roscher, Geir Sviggum, Tine Vigmostad and Kristin Nordland Brattli, Wikborg Rein Advokatfirma AS
tion, annual accounts, annual reports or storing accounts are criminally punishable. The penalty provisions are general in nature and apply to violations of all provisions relat - ing to accounting and bookkeeping. Thus, the provisions do not only apply to violations of the Accounting and Bookkeeping Acts, but also, for example, to violations of accounting rules in tax legislation. 2.4 Public Officials The Penal Code does not contain any provisions that specifically address the misappropriation of public funds by a public official, the unlawful tak - ing of interest by a public official, embezzlement of public funds by a public official or favouritism by a public official. However, the general provisions related to, for example, the misappropriation of funds, fraud, or breach of financial trust (Sections 324, 371 and 390 respectively) may be applicable. In respect of the latter, the penal provision for breach of financial trust also specifically mentions that it would be considered an aggravating factor that the act was carried out by a public official (Sec - tion 390, second paragraph). It should also be noted that, according to the general rules on the determination of penalties, it is an aggravating circumstance that a criminal offence was committed in the course of public service (Section 77 of the Penal Code). 2.5 Intermediaries It is commonly understood that the wording of Sections 387 and 388 of the Penal Code is wide enough to include the channelling of bribes through third parties such as family members, nominee companies, agents or other intermedi - aries. Case law shows that both legal and natural
persons have been held liable for violations of Sections 387 and 388 by engaging third parties to participate in bribery or other corrupt transac - tions on their behalf. Third parties involved in such offences may be held liable for criminal complicity (Section 15 of the Penal Code). 2.6 Lobbyists Lobbying activities are not directly regulated by Norwegian legislation. However, the Quarantine Act (LOV 2015-06-19- 70) sets out rules on quarantine in certain situ - ations when politicians, public officials/govern - ment employees transfer to new positions, for example, to companies in the private sector that carry out lobbying activities. The Quarantine Act also has rules on the obligation to provide infor - mation in connection with transfers covered by the act. Also, as noted in 2.1 Bribery , Section 389 of the Penal Code criminalises active and passive “trading in influence” in the public and private sector, committed in Norway or abroad. Typically, trading in influence occurs when an influencing agent (eg, a lobbyist) demands, receives or accepts an offer of an improper advantage in return for secretly exerting influ - ence on a third person’s (ie, a decision-maker’s) professional conduct. Both the influencing agent (eg, a lobbyist) and the person offering or giving the advantage are exposed to criminal liability, see 2.2 Influence-Peddling . When assessing whether the advantage is “improper” within the meaning of Section 389, particular importance is placed on whether the influencing agent (eg, a lobbyist) openly informs
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