Cartels 2025

ISRAEL Law and Practice Contributed by: Talya Solomon, Iris Achmon, Ekaterina Yaremchuk and Niva Orion, Herzog Fox & Neeman

1. Cartels Law and Regulation 1.1 Legal Bases The statutory basis in Israeli law for challeng - ing cartel behaviour and/or effect is primarily the Israeli Economic Competition Law 1988 (ECL), which prohibits “restrictive arrangements” : agreements between people (including entities) conducting business under which at least one of the parties restricts itself in a manner which may prevent or reduce competition. Further - more, certain agreements between competitors pertaining to prices, quantities, market sharing, or profits are irrefutably presumed to reduce competition (see 1.4 “Cartel Conduct” ). In addition, according to the ECL, any act or omission contrary to the provisions of the ECL or decisions and orders thereunder is a tort under the Israeli Tort Ordinance (New Version) ( “Tort Ordinance” ). This clause enables civil lawsuits, including class actions. 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties The Israeli Competition Authority (ICA), headed by the Competition Commissioner ( “Commis- sioner” ), is the Israeli authority responsible for the enforcement of the ECL′s provisions. • Cartel behaviours are usually enforced through criminal procedures – the ICA staff is authorised by Israel’s Attorney General to file criminal indictments under the ECL. The Commissioner is authorised to impose vari - ous kinds of administrative sanctions. “Public statement 1/12: Guidelines on the Use of Financial Sanctions Enforcement Procedures” ( “Public Statement 1/12” ) explains how cases are routed to criminal or administrative enforcement. According to Public Statement 1/12, as a rule, cartel behaviour will be chal -

lenged through criminal procedures. Cartels routed to administrative enforcement are few and far between. • The potential criminal penalties – a com - pany that was part of a cartel is exposed to a criminal fine of ILS4.52 million. Individuals that would be deemed responsible will be exposed to up to five years of imprisonment or a criminal fine of up to ILS2.26 million. • Officers’ liability – in addition, the ECL′s crim - inal liability provision set that an officer must supervise and do “everything possible” to prevent a breach of the ECL by their company or an employee. A breach of this provision can lead to up to one year of imprisonment or criminal penalties of up to ILS750,300. • The potential administrative sanctions – the ECL sets maximum monetary sanctions that enable the Commissioner to impose admin - istrative fines on individuals and companies up to ILS1,189,940. For companies with total sales turnover (in Israel) in the year before the violation that exceeded ILS10 million, the maximum administrative fine is up to ILS118,994,440. In terms of jurisdiction, as the ECL is territorial, the ICA has the authority to enforce any breach of ECL provisions that occur in Israel. However, extraterritorial reach applies in certain circum - stances. With regard to foreign entities, the ICA applies the “effect doctrine” to acquire extrater - ritorial jurisdiction over restrictive arrangements, including cartels, performed outside of Israel that limit the competition in Israel. 1.3 Private Enforcement Any infringement of the ECL, by action or omis - sion, is a tort under the Israeli Tort Ordinance. Thus, all chapters of the ECL, including cartels and restrictive arrangements, are also enforce - able by private actions.

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