MEXICO Law and Practice Contributed by: Alejandro Mendiola Diaz, Pedro Isaac Alcalá Berhouague and Benjamín Uriel Salinas Morales, Nader, Hayaux & Goebel
1.9 Guides Published by Governmental Authorities COFECE and IFT regularly publish non-binding guidelines to help stakeholders understand car - tel enforcement. COFECE’s guidelines (last revised in 2020), include the following. • Guidelines on information exchange between competitors. • Guidelines for initiating an investigation. • Guidelines on the investigation of absolute monopolistic practices. • Guidelines on the leniency and fine reduction programme. These documents are available on COFECE’s website . IFT guidelines focus on the following. • Fine reductions in cartel cases. • Guidelines related to anti-competitive prac - tices and mergers. This information is available on the IFT’s website. These documents are key interpretative tools but are not legally binding. 2. Early Stages of Cartel Enforcement 2.1 Initial Investigation Cartel investigations in Mexico may begin in four ways. • Through a complaint filed by any person or entity, even if not directly affected.
• exchanging non-confidential information, where permitted by law; and • respecting the jurisdiction of other countries when conduct is being simultaneously investi - gated abroad. These practices reflect a commitment to interna - tional co-operation and mutual respect among enforcement agencies, even in the absence of formal treaty obligations. 1.8 Enforcement Priorities In Mexico, most cartel enforcement actions focus on price fixing, which remains the most commonly investigated and sanctioned form of absolute monopolistic practice. Bid rigging is also significant, particularly in sectors where formal procurement processes are used. Addi - tionally, there have been cases involving market allocation and output restriction, which often appear as complementary or associated con - duct within broader price-fixing schemes. Most cartel cases are domestic in nature, with only a small number involving cross-border con - duct. However, there is growing engagement in international co-operation, as seen in recent investigations into global industries such as fra - grances. In terms of detection, ex officio investigations currently outnumber leniency applications. While the leniency programme remains a key enforce - ment tool, its use has declined in recent years despite some rebound. As a result, the com - petition authorities have relied increasingly on proactive investigation strategies to detect and prosecute cartel behaviour.
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