MEXICO Law and Practice Contributed by: Alejandro Mendiola Diaz, Pedro Isaac Alcalá Berhouague and Benjamín Uriel Salinas Morales, Nader, Hayaux & Goebel
3. Leniency, Immunity and Whistle- Blower Regimes 3.1 Leniency Mexico operates a formal leniency programme available to companies or individuals that have participated in cartel conduct. The programme is not limited to a single applicant; several par - ticipants in the same case may request benefits depending on their position in the queue and the value of their co-operation. To qualify, applicants must: • provide sufficient evidence to allow the authority to presume the existence of a cartel; • fully and continuously co-operate with the authority throughout the investigation and, if necessary, the trial phase; and • immediately cease all participation in the alleged conduct. If these conditions are met, the first applicant may receive full immunity or be subject only to a symbolic minimum fine, typically imposed to preserve a formal record of the sanction. This allows the authority to include the participant in the public register of sanctioned entities. Subsequent applicants may also benefit from fine reductions – typically 50%, 30% or 20% – depending on their place in line and the rel - evance of their evidence. The leniency programme is discretionary: although the requirements are clearly defined, the authority evaluates each case based on the applicant’s co-operation and timeliness. A marker process exists, allowing an applicant to secure a position in line while finalising their submission. Once a marker is granted, the appli -
cant has a limited period to provide the required documentation and evidence. Use and Effectiveness The programme has been an essential tool in uncovering cartels, but its use has varied. Filings peaked in 2016 with 26 applications, dropped to just two in 2021, and later rose again to 15 in 2023 before falling to eight in 2024. While the exact number of successful applications is con - fidential, COFECE has reported that many inves - tigations originate from leniency, even when initi - ated ex officio. To strengthen the programme, COFECE has pro - posed improvements such as the following. • Increasing confidentiality safeguards. • Enhancing outreach to legal advisers and potential applicants. • Improving transparency on outcomes without breaching legal secrecy. The authority has also published non-binding guidelines outlining the procedural steps, co- operation expectations, and conditions under which leniency may be revoked. 3.2 Amnesty/Immunity Mexican law does not provide for a standalone amnesty regime. Instead, a conditional leniency programme allows cartel participants to reduce sanctions by ceasing their conduct, submitting evidence, and fully co-operating with the author - ity. Full immunity – ie, exemption from admin - istrative fines – is not guaranteed, and no total immunity or unconditional amnesty exists under Mexican law. 3.3 Whistle-Blowers Mexico does not have a whistle-blower regime specific to cartel enforcement. The Competition
210 CHAMBERS.COM
Powered by FlippingBook