MEXICO Law and Practice Contributed by: Alejandro Mendiola Diaz, Pedro Isaac Alcalá Berhouague and Benjamín Uriel Salinas Morales, Nader, Hayaux & Goebel
• the Tax Administration Service (SAT); and • the Consumer Protection Agency (PRO - FECO). These agreements facilitate information exchange, joint studies, and co-ordinated responses to suspected anticompetitive behav - iour. PROFECO and the Ministry of Economy may file cartel complaints directly. However, confidential information protected under com - petition law cannot be shared without legal basis or consent. Such inter-agency co-ordination has played a critical role in investigations, particularly in sec - tors like energy, finance, and public procure - ment. 4.5 International Inter-Agency Co- Operation Mexico’s competition authorities engage active - ly in international co-operation through bilateral agreements and participation in multilateral fora such as the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD, and APEC. COFECE has signed agreements with agencies like the European Commission, US DOJ, and UK CMA to support information exchange, staff collaboration, and co-ordinated enforcement. Although investigations remain independent, cross-border co-operation can shape priorities and scope. COFECE’s effectiveness depends on technical capabilities and alignment with global enforcement standards. 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments Criminal prosecution of cartel conduct in Mexico is led by the Federal Attorney General’s Office (FGR), typically following a complaint by the competition authority. Although filing can occur without a final administrative decision, it is rare before administrative proceedings conclude.
Cases are tried before a federal criminal judge (not a jury), and the FGR must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanctions are individualised and follow formal criminal procedures. Defendants are entitled to constitutional guaran - tees, including due process and access to evi - dence used against them. However, discovery is limited, and access to third-party evidence requires court authorisation. 4.7 Issuing Civil Complaints Mexico does not allow private civil actions to enforce competition law directly. Cartel enforce - ment is handled administratively by COFECE or IFT. However, once a decision becomes final and is upheld by the courts, affected parties may bring civil claims for damages or lost profits before specialised federal courts. Third parties may also file formal complaints to trigger investigations. These must include the identity of the alleged parties, a description of the conduct and its competitive impact, and supporting evidence (eg, emails, documents, or market data). The authority may open an investigation, request more information, or reject the complaint. Dur - ing the confidential investigation phase, defend - ants do not have access to the file. Full access is granted only after a Statement of Probable Liability is issued, enabling the defence to review evidence and present arguments. 4.8 The Role of Experts Experts – primarily economists – play a key role in cartel defence, especially in market analysis and pricing assessments. Depending on the sector, parties may also retain specialists in digi - tal, telecom, transport, or other technical fields. Their use is not mandatory but often essential
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