MEXICO Law and Practice Contributed by: Alejandro Mendiola Diaz, Pedro Isaac Alcalá Berhouague and Benjamín Uriel Salinas Morales, Nader, Hayaux & Goebel
when complex factual or economic arguments are involved. Experts play a key role in cartel investigations and defence strategies. Econo - mists are the most frequently retained experts, especially in complex market analyses or when evaluating pricing behaviour, market shares, or economic effects of the alleged conduct. 4.9 Possibility of Multiple Proceedings Cartel enforcement in Mexico is typically con - ducted through a single administrative proceed - ing involving all alleged participants. The Com - petition Law prohibits parallel investigations on the same facts by the same authority, in line with the constitutional principle of non bis in idem. However, administrative and criminal proceed - ings may run in parallel, as they are distinct in purpose and legal framework. Evidence may be shared between authorities but is evaluated independently, with no binding effect across proceedings. See 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties and 4.6 Issuing Crimi- nal Indictments . 5. Sanctions and Remedies in Criminal Cartel Enforcement 5.1 Imposition of Sanctions/Fines In Mexico, sanctions for cartel conduct are imposed directly by the enforcement authorities through an administrative resolution issued at the conclusion of the trial-like procedure. These sanctions may include fines of up to 10% of the infringing party’s annual income, and additional penalties such as disqualification of individuals from holding executive or decision-making posi - tions for up to five years. Affected parties can challenge the resolution by filing an amparo indirecto before the Specialized
Federal Courts in Competition, Telecommunica - tions and Broadcasting, which review the legality and constitutionality of the enforcement action. In cases where a criminal complaint is filed (see 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments ), criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment of five to ten years, may be imposed exclusively by federal criminal courts following a separate process led by the Attorney General’s Office. While most cartel investigations lead to for - mal charges and eventual sanctions, some are closed with no action if the Investigative Author - ity finds insufficient evidence. COFECE does not regularly publish the exact percentage of inves - tigations that are closed without further action, but public records suggest that a minority of investigations do not proceed to the sanction - ing phase. 5.2 Plea Bargaining/Settlement Mexican law does not allow plea bargaining or settlement in cartel (absolute monopolistic prac - tices) cases. Once an investigation begins, the process follows a formal administrative path. The only available mechanism offering benefits is the Leniency Programme, which may reduce or eliminate fines if strict co-operation conditions are met (see 3.1 Leniency ). 5.3 Effect of Liability Being Established A final finding of liability for cartel conduct may trigger collateral effects, particularly in public procurement, where companies and individuals can be barred from future tenders under anti- corruption rules. Final resolutions may also sup - port civil claims for damages. These effects are not automatic and cannot be mitigated through settlement, as no such procedure exists in cartel enforcement.
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