MEXICO Law and Practice Contributed by: Alejandro Mendiola Diaz, Pedro Isaac Alcalá Berhouague and Benjamín Uriel Salinas Morales, Nader, Hayaux & Goebel
7.7 Leniency v Ex Officio Investigations In Mexico, COFECE operates a leniency pro - gramme that allows multiple participants in a cartel – not just a single applicant – to receive reduced sanctions. The extent of the benefit depends on the order in which they co-oper - ate, and the value of the information provided. In practice, up to four or more undertakings involved in the same case may benefit from Leniency applications have fluctuated over the years. Applications peaked in 2016 and then declined to their lowest point in 2021. Although there was a rebound in 2023, filings dropped again in 2024. This suggests an overall down - ward trend in participation despite the advan - tages offered by the programme, such as full immunity for the first applicant and significant reductions for others. immunity or fine reductions. Trends in Leniency Filings COFECE has recognised this issue and, in public forums, has cited structural challenges affecting the programme’s effectiveness. These include the following. • Concerns about the safety and confidentiality of whistle-blowers in small or highly con - nected markets. • Limited awareness of the programme’s ben - efits among legal professionals. • Uncertainty when multiple government bodies are involved. • The lack of visible success stories that might encourage more companies to come forward. To address these concerns, COFECE has pro - posed actions such as improving legal certainty, increasing transparency on case outcomes, and reinforcing protections for applicants.
Increase in Ex Officio Investigations At the same time, COFECE has increasingly relied on ex officio investigations. Although specific figures are confidential, the author - ity initiates far more cartel investigations on its own than through external complaints or formal reports. It is worth noting that due to the confidential nature of leniency applications, it is often impos - sible to determine whether some ex officio cases are later supported by information from leniency applicants. In many cases, the two mechanisms may complement each other. Conclusion While COFECE’s leniency programme remains a cornerstone of cartel enforcement in Mexico, participation has declined in recent years. In response, the Commission has expanded its use of ex officio investigations while continuing efforts to restore confidence in its leniency tools. Strengthening outreach, transparency, and safe - guards will be key to increasing the programme’s future impact. 7.8 Domestic v International Investigations In Mexico, cartel investigations are overwhelm - ingly domestic. Approximately 90% of cases handled by COFECE involve conduct confined to national markets. Only around 10% have a cross-border element. This pattern is largely due to the nature of the sectors prioritised by COFECE – such as food, health, transport, energy, and public procure - ment – which are typically composed of local players. In addition, international enforcement requires co-ordination with foreign authorities, which is more complex and resource intensive.
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