Cartels 2025

SOUTH KOREA Law and Practice Contributed by: John H. Choi, Changhun Lee, Hyunah Kim and Jae-Hyuk Choi, Shin & Kim

6.8 Judicial Review or Appeal The losing party at the first-instance court may file an appeal within two weeks of the date of receipt of the first-instance court’s decision. At the appellate court, parties may submit new evi - dence that was not submitted at the first-instance court, and may make new arguments regarding the facts and law. It usually takes around one year for the appellate court to announce its deci - sion. If the appellate court finds it necessary, a reassessment process for the damages amount may also take place. The losing party at the appellate court may file an appeal to the Supreme Court within two weeks of the date of receipt of the appellate court’s decision. At the Supreme Court, only law is reviewed, not facts. It is difficult to predict how long it will take for the Supreme Court to announce its decision. Although not limited to damages lawsuits for cartels, according to statistics announced by the court in 2024, the rate of appeal to the appellate court for civil cases in 2023 was around 48.5%, and the rate of appeal to the Supreme Court was around 35.7%. 7. Trends in Cartel Enforcement 7.1 Information Sharing as a Cartel Offence See 1.4 “Cartel Conduct” . 7.2 Use of AI and Algorithms In August 2024, the KFTC commenced a mar - ket survey on AI, focusing on major domestic and international companies. In December 2024, it released a policy report titled “Generative AI and Competition” . During a press briefing, a KFTC representative stated that no domestic

cases of algorithm-based cartels had yet been addressed. Meanwhile, in its January 2025 work plan, the KFTC announced its intention to conduct in- depth analyses and develop countermeasures for emerging cartel types, including AI-based cartels, based on legal theories and international trends. 7.3 Monopolisation as a Cartel Offence Under the MRFTA, abuse of dominance by a company holding a dominant market position is regulated as a violation of the Act. Similar to how cartel conduct is specified under the MRFTA, various types of abuse of dominance are also specifically stipulated. While cartel conduct requires co-ordination among two or more busi - nesses, abuse of dominance involves unilateral actions by a dominant company. Nevertheless, under the MRFTA, regulations governing abuse of dominance and cartels may influence one another. For instance, the KFTC’s Guidelines for Abuse of Market Dominance consider the likelihood of competitors engaging in cartel conduct as a factor when assessing market dominance. Moreover, in assessing the illegality of a cartel, its anti-competitive effects must be evaluated, and the market dominance of the cartel participants serves as an impor - tant criterion in this evaluation. According to the KFTC’s Guidelines for Cartel Review, the greater the dominance held by the cartel participants, the more likely it is that the cartel in question will have anti-competitive effects. 7.4 Focus on Certain Industries/Sectors In 2024, the KFTC actively enforced cartel regu - lations across key industries such as steel and automobiles, as well as sectors closely related to everyday life including vaccines and built-

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