Cartels 2025

CHINA Law and Practice Contributed by: Qian Xiaoqiang, Yang Yikai and Chu Linxian, Haiwen & Partners

• immediately cease the cartel conduct after the application unless the Competition Authorities require the continuation of con - duct to ensure the smooth progress of the investigation, and report to the Competi - tion Authorities any existing application for leniency to foreign Competition Authorities and any requirements to continue the cartel conduct (if any); • swiftly, continuously, comprehensively and sincerely co-operate with the investigation; • properly preserve and provide relevant evidence and information, and refrain from concealing, destroying or falsifying relevant information; • refrain from disclosing, without the Competi - tion Authorities’ consent, the fact that leni - ency was applied; and • refrain from any other conduct that could affect the investigation. Exemption or reduction bands for fines under the leniency regime For qualified applicants, the Competition Author - ities may grant exemptions or reductions in fines within the following bands. • The first undertaking providing essential evi - dence will obtain a reduction of 80–100%. If this undertaking submits the application and receives the Competition Authorities’ written confirmation for its application as the first in line before the initiation of the investigation, the reduction shall be 100%, provided that it has neither organised nor coerced others into reaching and implementing the cartel agree - ment. • The second undertaking will obtain a reduc - tion of 30–50%. • The third undertaking will obtain a reduction of 20–30%.

• Subsequent undertakings will obtain a reduc - tion of no more than 20%. Immunity Regime The AML also establishes the exemption system for monopolistic agreements, and the justifica - tions and exemptions are specified in Article 20 of the AML (see 1.4 “Cartel Conduct” ). 3.2 Amnesty/Immunity There is no separate amnesty regime applica - ble for any cartel-related violations under PRC legislation. 3.3 Whistle-Blowers It can be said that the whistle-blower regime in China for all cartel conduct includes the leniency programme under the AML and certain public reporting mechanisms. • Leniency Programme (see 3.1 Leniency for details). • Public reporting – the Competition Authorities accept reports of suspected monopoly agree - ments, including cartels, from the public. Whistle-blowers must provide written facts and corresponding evidence of the alleged conduct. China does not currently offer financial rewards to whistle-blowers who are not one party of the cartel (who can benefit from waived/reduced penalties through leniency). There are no explicit legal requirements for com - panies to set up internal whistle-blower hotlines for cartel reporting. However, in practice, the Anti-monopoly Compliance Guide for Under - takings issued by SAMR encourages compa - nies to establish robust internal compliance pro - grammes, including mechanisms for employees to report potential antitrust violations internally.

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