Cartels 2025

EU Law and Practice Contributed by: Andrzej Kmiecik, Richard Burton and Catherine Gordley, Van Bael & Bellis

for infringements of procedural provisions (ie, those concerning requests for information or the conduct of inspections), in which case the limitation period is reduced to three years. This limitation period is interrupted, and starts running afresh, whenever at least one of the undertakings concerned is notified of any action taken by the Commission or a national competi - tion authority for the purpose of an investigation or proceedings regarding the infringement. How - ever, any fine will be time-barred where twice the limitation period – ie, ten years (or six years in the case of procedural infringements) – has passed since the end of the infringement. 1.6 Jurisdiction The European Commission has jurisdiction to apply the EU competition rules in relation to any anti-competitive agreement or collusion that is – at least in part – implemented within the EU, even if it originates outside the EU. This was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Wood Pulp I case. On several occasions, the Commission has also sought to rely on the so-called “qualified effects” test to establish jurisdiction over foreign conduct where it is foreseeable that the conduct in question will have an immediate and substantial effect in the EU. Although the application of the qualified effects test is not without controversy, the CJEU suggested in the Intel case that it may also be used to determine the Commission’s jurisdiction under both Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 1.7 Principles of Comity The European Commission has recognised the importance of respecting the interests of non- EU countries in the application of its competition rules, in accordance with the principle of nega - tive comity. The CJEU has also recognised the principle of non-interference in matters within

the jurisdiction of foreign competition authori - ties. However, the CJEU has not issued any clear ruling on whether the principle of comity is appli - cable under EU law. Comity principles have also been endorsed in the dedicated bilateral co-operation agreements in competition matters that the Commission has entered into with competition authorities in the USA (1991), Canada (1999), Japan (2003), South Korea (2009) and Switzerland (2013). The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK (2020) also makes provision for co-operation and co-ordination between the EU and UK’s competition authorities post-Brexit. In October 2024, the European Commission and the UK government announced that they had concluded negotiations on a competition co- operation agreement putting this provision into effect and, in May 2025, a draft of the agreement was published following the EU and UK’s first post-Brexit summit. At the time of writing, the agreement is yet to enter into force. 1.8 Enforcement Priorities The European Commission’s recent enforcement practice has largely focused on cartels having a pan-European or broader impact, encompassing price fixing, market sharing and other arrange - ments. At present, the Commission’s case load is reportedly evenly balanced between leniency- generated and ex officio cases. 1.9 Guides Published by Governmental Authorities The European Commission publishes a number of guides and other information relating to cartel conduct and enforcement. These can be found on DG Comp’s portal.

CHAMBERS.COM