EU Law and Practice Contributed by: Andrzej Kmiecik, Richard Burton and Catherine Gordley, Van Bael & Bellis
4.5 International Inter-Agency Co- Operation The European Commission often co-operates with non-EU competition authorities. In the case of information submitted in the context of leniency, information exchanges between the Commission and non-EU competition authori - ties will only take place provided that leniency applicants provide the Commission with waivers of their confidentiality rights in relation to other competition authorities to which the undertaking concerned has applied for leniency. The EU has concluded dedicated competition co-operation agreements with Canada, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the USA. An EU-UK competition co-operation agreement is awaiting entry into force (see 1.7 Principles of Comity ). Co-operation between the European Commis - sion and other competition authorities has regu - larly been centre-stage in several cartel cases. For instance, between 2013 and 2020, the Com - mission issued decisions in numerous cartels involving automotive parts, which had world - wide ramifications and involved co-operation between the Commission and non-EU competi - tion authorities, including the Japan Fair Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice. More recently, there have been fewer reported cartel proceedings at EU level that have involved the Commission co-ordinating with non-EU competition authorities. Co-ordination between the Commission and non-EU competition authorities can add sig - nificant complexity to cartel proceedings. Par - ties under investigation may face co-ordinated inspections or requests for information from the various authorities involved, and may also be requested to provide waivers to allow for
the sharing of information between the relevant authorities. 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments EU law does not provide for criminal sanctions in respect of infringements of EU competition law. 4.7 Issuing Civil Complaints Under the EU competition rules, it is the Euro - pean Commission (rather than a court) that is empowered both to investigate and to decide upon cartel matters, subject to the review of the EU courts. Following an investigation, and where the Commission intends to find a cartel infringe - ment, it must first formally initiate proceedings. At this point, national competition authorities lose their concurrent jurisdiction. Next, the Commission must issue an SO to the target company to notify it of the Commission’s objections to the agreement or practice, and set out the supporting facts and legal reason - ing. As the SO is only a preparatory document, it may not be challenged before the EU courts. The SO provides the target of the Commission’s investigation with an opportunity to respond to the case against it. Furthermore, the target of the Commission’s investigation will also have an opportunity to access the file of the Commission in order to review the evidence against it. 4.8 The Role of Experts In cartel cases, the European Commission does not generally identify in its decisions the level of harm caused by a cartel, such that economists or other experts are most likely to be involved in any follow-on actions for damages before national courts. 4.9 Possibility of Multiple Proceedings Generally, conduct involving the same or related facts will be subject to a single enforcement pro -
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